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EQUITY IN PUBLIC EDUCATION: SCHOOL-FINANCE
REFORM IN MICHIGAN
William S. Koski*

In the two decades since the Michigan Supreme Court refused
to accept the responsibility of directing Michigan school-finance
reform and dumped it into the political arena,1 the debate over
improving the quality and equity in Michigan schools has
raged.2 Born as a response to political maneuvering and a
school finance lawsuit pitting the Governor against the State
Treasurer,3 the Bursley Act resolved the first round of the
*
Article Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Volume 26,
1993. B.B.A. 1990, University of Michigan; J.D. expected 1993, University of Michigan
Law School. I am grateful to Professor C. Philip Kearney of the University of Michigan
School of Education for his insightful comments on an earlier draft of this Note. I would
also like to thank David Morrison, Marcus Asner, Michael Schiffer, and Lilah Raynor
Koski for their helpful editing suggestions.
1.
See Milliken v. Green (Milliken 11), 212 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973) (dismissing
an action challenging the constitutionality of Michigan's school finance system),
vacating (Milliken I), 203 N.W.2d 457 (Mich. 1972); see also Elwood Hain, Milliken v.
Green. Breaking the Legislative Deadlock, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 350, 359 (1974)
(noting the Michigan Supreme Court's desire to avoid political credit or blame for the
legislative school-finance reforms set in motion).
2.
See Rick Pluta, EnglerProposesEducationFundingReforms, UPI,Feb. 6,1992,
availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File; Rick Pluta, Share-the-Wealth School Funding Plan Sent to Engler, UPI, Sept. 24, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI
File; School Equality: State FinancingIs FallingBehind the Needs, DET. FREE PRESS,
Nov. 13, 1981, at 8A; David Wilkins, Ann Arbor Spends Big for Extras in Schools, ANN
ARBOR NEWS, Jan. 26, 1992, at Dl.
Recently, the Michigan electorate defeated two state property tax proposals which
would have undoubtedly affected the state's public schools. See Malcolm Johnson,
Property TaxIssues Defeated, ANN ARBOR NEWS, Nov. 4, 1992, at Al 0. Proposal A would
have limited homestead assessment increases to five percent or inflation, whichever is
less, until the property is sold, while providing no state reimbursement for schools or
local units of government. Id. Proposal C, known as "Cut and Cap" and supported by
Republican Governor John Engler, would have cut school taxes by 30% over five years,
limited assessment increases to three percent or inflation, whichever is less, and reimbursed schools for lost revenues by increasing state contributions. Id. "Cut and Cap"
reimbursement was to be funded by an anticipated, but uncertain, growth in state
revenues. Id. Although it is difficult to ascertain the public's motivation in rejecting
the property tax proposals, both were vehemently opposed by educational groups. Id.;
Engler Stifles Academic Freedom, Suppresses Truth About Proposal C, Say Michigan
EducationAssociation,PR NEWSWIRE, Oct. 30, 1992, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Omni File; University Professors: "C" Would Hurt Educationat All Levels in Michigan,
PR NEWSWIRE, Oct. 28, 1992, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File. In the wake
of the electoral defeat of Proposals A and C, several school-finance reform measures
have been introduced in the state legislature. See infra note 261.
3.
Milliken 11, 212 N.W.2d at 711; Hain, supra note 1, at 360.
4.
1973 Mich. Pub. Acts 101, repealed by State School Aid Act of 1977, MICH.
CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 388.401-.1572 (West 1989), repealed by State School Act of 1979,
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 388.1601-.1772 (West 1989).
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school-finance debate, promising to reduce the disparities
between Michigan's rich and poor school districts.'
Nearly twenty years later severe disparities still exist,6 and
the legislature continues to grapple with the complex problem
of providing a quality education and an equal opportunity for
Michigan's children without further burdening Michigan's
taxpayers. This Note argues that the only adequate compromise between the pressure to limit taxes and the need to
provide both educational quality and equity is to institute a
form of full-state funded education.' Part I of this Note briefly
defines equity in public education and discusses the importance
of increasing equity. Part II discusses other values and
concerns that arise in the school-finance debate, such as liberty,
local control, efficiency, and quality of education. Part III
considers several fundamental school-finance alternatives. Part
IV provides a historical overview of Michigan school financereform and a description of the current State School Aid Act 9
and its resulting inequities. The Note concludes in Part V by
arguing that the future of Michigan's children is best secured
through a system of full-state funding.
I. THE DIMENSIONS OF EDUCATIONAL EQUITY

As the former chair of the United States House of Representatives' Committee on Education and Labor, Augustus F.
Hawkins once opined, "The concept of equal opportunity is
deeply embedded in our national ethos. We Americans love to
be seen as good sports who guarantee a fair chance for all."10
But this only begs the question. What does it mean to strive
for equity in public education? Are we striving for equal
funding per student?
An equal level of educational

5.

See Hain,supra note 1, at 361 (discussing the equalizing characteristics of the

Bursley Act).
6.
See infra part IV.D; see also C. Philip Kearney & Li-Ju Chen, MeasuringEquity
in Michigan School Finance: A Further Look, 14 J. EDUC. FIN. 319, 361-67 (1989)
(concluding that equity in Michigan Schools declined in the period between 1979 and
1985); Rick Pluta, Robin Hood Tax Goes to Senate, UPI, Sept. 17, 1991, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (noting that Michigan's per-student spending is
approximately $9000 in the wealthiest school district and $2200 in the poorest).
7.
See Rick Pluta, EducationReform Plan Unveiled, UPI, Feb. 14, 1991, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
8.
See infra part III (discussing full-state funding, as well as other schoolfinancing alternatives).
9.
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 388.1601-.1772 (West 1989).
10.
Augustus F. Hawkins, Equity in Education, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 565, 565
(1991).
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achievement? In Michigan, as elsewhere, per-student funding
inequities arise from several factors, including varying property
tax rates1 ' and property tax bases. 2 Inequities in educational
outcome, on the other hand, may result from any number of
factors, including teacher quality,13 parental influence, or the
child's motivation. 4 Some argue that equity should be measured by the educational inputs, especially money, available to
each child,' 5 while others require substantially equal educational achievements.'" The problem is clear: before we can
consider the best ways to combat the inequities in our schools,
we first must understand what is meant by educational equity.
A. Defining Equity17 in Education
In constructing a working definition of equity in public school
finance, several dimensions of equity should be considered: (1)

11.
See MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 388.1621 (West 1989).
12.
See id.
13.
Ronald F. Ferguson, Payingfor Public Education: New Evidence on How and
Why Money Matters, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 465, 475-78 (1991) (finding a statistically
significant correlation between teachers' language skills and student performance).
14.
1 JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 217-333
(1966).
15.
JOHN E. COONS ET AL., PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 25 (1970) ([Tihe
measure of quality [is] not what is achieved but what is available .... Quality is the
sum of district expenditures per pupil; quality is money.").
16.
Former U.S. Secretary of Education William Bennett penned, "Let me be clear
about what I mean by education reform. Fundamentally, education reform is a matter
of improved results. It aims directly at bringing about measurable improvements in
the knowledge and skills of American students. Education reform looks first to output,
not input." WILLIAM J. BENNETT, OUR CHILDREN AND OUR COUNTRY 222 (1988) (emphasis
omitted); see also Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212-13 (Ky.
1989) (requiring the state to create education reforms which will provide each child in
Kentucky with an adequate education consisting of sufficient communication skills;
social, economic, and political knowledge; understanding of government; and academic
or vocational skills to allow the child to compete with other students for positions in
higher education and the job market); Richard J. Stark, Education Reform: Judicial
Interpretation of State Constitutions' Education Finance Provisions-Adequacy vs.
Equality, 1991 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 609, 612-16 (1991) (arguing that an equal funding
rule does not guarantee an adequate education).
17.
Initially, the state may draw a distinction between "equity," defined as the
state of being just, impartial, or fair, and the more narrowly defined "equality," or
"evenness in the distribution of benefits." Norman C. Thomas, Equalizing Educational
Opportunity Through School FinanceReform: A Review Assessment, 48 U. CIN. L. REV.
255, 263 (1979). Although this distinction is entirely valid and meaningful-an equal
distribution of school finance resources may not be an equitable one-school-finance
policy discussions consider "equity" to be the more accurate term reflecting modern
school-finance concerns and the need to treat differently situated individuals
differently. See, e.g., AUSTIN D. SWANSON & RICHARD A. KING, SCHOOL FINANCE: ITS
ECONOMICS AND POLITICS 240 (1991).
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"who is the target of the equity assessment, that is, equity for
whom?";18 (2) what "objects" (inputs, outputs, outcomes) should
be distributed fairly among the equity targets?; 9 and (3) "what
principles should be used to determine whether a particular
distribution is equitable?" 20 This Note will consider each of
these dimensions in turn.
1. Equity for Whom?: The Equity Target-Students are the
most obvious targets for an equitable distribution of educational
resources. Children of low-income parents often attend poorer
school districts with inexperienced teachers, larger classes, and
shoddier physical resources. 2' To continue to deprive poor
children of a fair chance in the classroom (in addition to their
upstream struggle against social and economic forces) surely
shows that Americans are not the "good sports" that we make
ourselves out to be. Fortunately, the federal government has
recognized the need for an equitable distribution of schoolfinance resources and has granted financial support to schools
attended by low-income students in an attempt to promote
equity. 22 But this federal equalization is far from complete;'
state mechanisms for creating equity are necessary and will
occupy the balance of this Note.
Students are not the only beneficiaries of school-finance
reform, however. Other groups, including parents and taxpayers, also have a claim on equitable school-finance mechanisms.
Parents heavily invest in their children's present and future
well-being and often make substantial life choices, such as the
choice of where to live, based upon their concerns for the
educational development of their children.'
Research has
suggested that the emphasis parents place on child rearing and
child development "transcends boundaries of [economic] class."2'
Unfortunately, the equal provision of educational resources does
not cross such economic boundaries. It is not unreasonable for
affluent parents to seek to protect their investment in their

18.

Kearney & Chen, supra note 6, at 322; see also SWANSON & KING, supranote

17, at 243 (posing a similar question).
19.
See Kearney & Chen, supra note 6, at 322; SWANSON & KING, supra note 17, at
243.
20.
SWANSON & KING, supra note 17, at 243.
21.
Charles S. Benson, Definitions of Equity in School Finance in Texas, New
Jersey, and Kentucky, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 401, 402 (1991).
22.
See Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2976
(1990).
23.
Benson, supra note 21, at 402.
24.
Eric A. Hanushek, When School Finance "Reform" May Not Be GoodPolicy, 28
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 423, 446 (1991).

25.
26.

Benson, supra note 21, at 403 & n.8.
See Stark, supra note 16, at 619 & n.46.

FALL 1992]

Equity in Public Education

children's educational future by maintaining that their local tax
dollars should be spent in their local school district. Nevertheless, "no humane educational policy should overlook the plight
of conscientious inner-city [and low-income] parents who must
send their children to grossly ineffective schools."2 7 The most
that can be asked of parents is an investment in raising happy
and competent children; society and the state should be
obligated to help fund the educational training.
Taxpayers also have a claim to equity in school finance.
Equity seems to require that equal burdens be placed on
taxpayers. In school finance, the traditional and awful choice
taxpayers face is between a heavier tax burden and more poorly
funded schools. 28 The equity issue arises when taxpayers in
property-poor districts must tax themselves at a higher rate to
obtain the same or similar amounts of revenue generated at a
lower rate in property-rich school districts. Property-poor
school districts accordingly receive unequal tax revenue from an
equal tax effort. Taxpayer equity requires fiscal neutrality2 9
(sometimes referred to as access equality), ° under which equal
tax rates yield equal tax revenues. The state's role is to ensure
that property-poor districts will collect as much as property-rich
districts at a given tax rate.3 '
But the problem of taxpayer equity goes far beyond this
familiar complaint of property-poor district residents and the
well-known regressivity of the property tax. 32 "The [property]
tax, in theory, is a tax on wealth; the amount of property one

27.
Benson, supra note 21, at 403.
28.
States such as Michigan rely heavily on local property taxation to support the
local school district. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 388.1621 (West 1989). Taxpayers
have the option of maintaining or increasing their local district's funding by levying a
higher tax rate on themselves in a millage election. C. PHILIP KEARNEY, A PRIMER ON
MICHIGAN SCHOOL FINANCE 5 (2d ed. 1990).
A "mill" is "a money of account equal to 1/10 cent," while a 'millage" is "a rate (as
of taxation) expressed in mills per dollar." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
754 (1987). Thus, a property tax millage rate of one translates into one dollar in taxes
for every one thousand dollars in assessed property value.
29.
COONS ET AL., supra note 15, at 2 ("The quality of public education may not be
a function of wealth other than the wealth of the state as a whole.").
30.
Gail F. Levine, Note, Meeting the Third Wave: Legislative Approaches to Recent
Judicial School Finance Rulings, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 507, 526-28 (1991) (discussing
access equality).
31.
COONS ET AL., supra note 15, at 34, 205. The state may make up the difference
from its school-financing funds derived from sources other than property taxes, or it
may employ a "Robin Hood" technique of "recapture" by taking away the excess
revenues generated at a given tax rate in a property-wealthy district and distributing
these revenues to property-poor districts. See SWANSON & KING, supra note 17, at 161.
32.
KEARNEY, supra note 28, at 27 (stating that "most economists agree that the
property tax is an extremely regressive tax").
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owns is considered to be a measure of a person's wealth ... "'
Perhaps this was true in the past, and it still may be true for
commercial, industrial, and agricultural property owners, but
inequities arise when taxing residential property owners, who
may own property assessed at high values but who do not have
the liquidity to pay the tax bill.' Another source of taxpayer
inequity is the quality of assessment practices within a given
assessing unit. The ability of assessors and the quality of
assessment varies considerably among the local assessing units
and even among the separate classes of property.35 Finally,
severe inequities stem from the unequal distribution of highly
valued commercial and industrial properties.
With the
"blessing" of a large industrial or commercial concern in its
district, a given local taxing unit can afford to levy a
significantly lower tax rate and still generate revenues
equivalent to a unit which levies much higher rates.3" Although
state tax law alleviates some of the burden that these inequities
create, 37 school-finance taxation is far from the equity ideal.3

33.
Id. at 26.
34.
Id.
35.
Id. at 27.
36.
Id. at 32-33.
37.
Michigan income and property tax law has several devices which go a long way
toward reducing the regressivity and the inequities of property taxation. To combat the
regressivity problem, Michigan adopted the Homestead Property Tax Credit. See MICH.
CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 206.520-.532 (West 1986 & Supp. 1992). The tax credit is one of the
most generous "circuit breaker" devices in the nation. KEARNEY, supranote 28, at 28. Under
the circuit breaker provision, the state will refund 60% of property taxes which exceed 3.5%
of total income for both renters and homeowners. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 206.522(lXa)
(West 1986 & Supp. 1992).
Because school funding is only one governmental function supported by local property
taxes (police and fire protection, city and county road service, and city and county courts are
others), Michigan has chosen to constitutionally limit the aggregate rates that can be levied
on property. The Michigan Constitution places a limit of 15 mills (18 mills where approved)
on the aggregate tax rate levied by school districts, townships and counties. MICH. CXONST.
art. IX, § 6. This limit may be exceeded, however, by voter override, but in no case can the
aggregate rate exceed 50 mills. Id.
A more complicated limit to Michigan property taxes is the Headlee Amendment, which
requires a reduction in the local property tax rate when the property tax base in a school
district increases in value faster than the rate of inflation. MICH. CONST. art. IM §§ 25-34.
Finally, the Michigan legislature recently adopted a controversial "Robin Hood" schoolfunding plan, which aims to take half of the new business property tax revenues from school
districts with property tax revenues high enough to disqualify them from receiving most
state school aid and to distribute the revenues to property-poor tax districts. See 1991 Mich.
Pub. Acts 108 (codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 380.752-.756 (West Supp. 1992)); see
also infra part IV.C (discussing the "Robin Hood" plan which is actually a form of recapture).
38.
KEARNEY, supranote 28, at 26. Of course, taxpayer equity is intimately intertwined
with state tax law not involving school-finance issues (such as provision of local police, fire
protection, and road service). This Note, however, only will consider taxpayer equity insofar
as equity is tied to local tax effort and the funding of education.
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2. Equity of What?: The Equity Object-The objects of
educational equity generally are grouped into inputs, outputs,
and outcomes." "Inputs" are the resources upon which schools
rely: dollars and the things that dollars can buy, such as
teachers, computers, and classrooms. Although inputs may be
measured by the actual amounts of physical resources at the
students' disposal,40 dollar inputs are the most common
measure of educational inputs because they may be easily
expressed in the form of revenues or expenditures per student.4 1
While this Note expressly uses input measures to evaluate
school finance equity, it should be noted that education
policymakers,4 2 researchers,43 and courts" all consider outputs
and outcomes as important measures of equity in education.
"Output" figures measure the products of the educational
process, such as student achievement or behavioral changes. 45
Finally, the "outcome" measure of school-finance equity looks to
the earnings, well-being, or quality of life that the student has
obtained. 4' Granted, it is entirely appropriate to focus on the
products of the educational system when evaluating the quality
of the system. In turn, an equitable system of public education
ideally should turn out competent and productive students. Yet
the output and outcome measures are inadequate and
impractical yardsticks for determining
the equity of school47
finance policy for several reasons.

39.
Kearney & Chen, supra note 6, at 322-23; SWANSON & KING, supra note 17, at
243. Note that the Michigan Supreme Court refused to decide upon a measure of equal
educational opportunity, partly because of a disagreement over the equity
object-inputs or outputs. Milliken v. Green (Milliken I!), 212 N.W.2d 711, 716 (Mich.
1973) (T.G. Kavanagh and Levin, JJ., concurring).
40.
See SWANSON & KING, supra note 17, at 243.
41.
See Kearney & Chen, supra note 6, at 323-24.
42.
See BENNETT, supra note 16, at 222.
43.
See Kearney & Chen, supra note 6, at 323.
44.
See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d at 186, 212-13 (Ky. 1989)
(defining an "efficient" system of education with reference to educational outputs).
45.
SWANSON & KING, supra note 17, at 243.
46.
Id.
47.
In most of the states which now operate under judicially mandated school
finance standards, the courts have primarily relied upon input measures of school
quality and equity. See, e.g., Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d
684, 690 (Mont. 1989) ("The State attempted to present an argument at trial that
equality of educational opportunity is more appropriately measured by output, . . .
rather than by input of dollars. The District Court concluded that the State had failed
to submit convincing evidence on the output theory of measurement. We agree . . . );
Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 374 (N.J. 1990) (finding output evidence of substantive
education to be "insufficient to exclude consideration of dollar input and expenditure
disparity"); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood 1), 777 S.W.2d 391, 397
(Tex. 1989) ("Children who live in poor districts and children who live in rich districts
must be afforded a substantially equal opportunity to have access to educational
funds.-).
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The first is practical: How would the state or school district
meet a requirement of equal educational outputs or outcomes?
Because there are so many factors beyond the control of schools
and teachers-parental influence, student discipline and
motivation, and peer influence-which affect educational
outputs and achievement,48 schools would find it difficult (if not
impossible) to produce balanced educational outputs. Second,
measuring educational equity based on outcomes is, at best,
Measuring achievement
difficult and, at worst, suspect.
through commonly used standardized testing materials only
gauges one aspect of interest in educational output-how well
our children can perform on standardized tests. These tests
ignore other important products of the educational system such
as maturity, citizenship, and self-concept; 49 and important
educational outcomes such as employment and income.5 °
Moreover, academic scholars have criticized standardized tests
for being subject to subtle biases which disadvantage children
based on race, socioeconomic status, or gender."' Put simply,
measuring educational output through standardized test scores
is incomplete and inaccurate.5 2 Finally, "quality might be
sacrificed to equality under [an output definition of equity].
The level of academic achievement need not be high, but simply
equal, to satisfy this principle. A graduating class of illiterates
would satisfy." 3
Because of these difficulties and pitfalls with measuring
equity on an outputs or outcomes scale, this Note evaluates

Even the Rose court in Kentucky, which focused on educational outputs as a measure
of its school system's efficiency, required "adequate funding" in order to meet its output
objectives. See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 216.
See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text. Note that the very fact that so
48.
many factors affect educational output and outcomes makes the value of increased
educational inputs questionable. Part I.B infra deals with the issues of how and why
equity in educational inputs is important.
John E. McDermott & Stephen P. Klein, The Cost-Quality Debate in School
49.
Finance Litigation: Do Dollars Make a Difference?, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 415,
424-27 (1974).

50.
51.

Thomas, supra note 17, at 264.
See ELAINE MENSH & HARRY MENSH, THE IQ MYTHOLOGY 51-55 (1991); JEROME M.

SAT1LER, ASSESSMENT OF CHILDREN'S INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL ABILITIES 356-60 (2d ed.

1982).
52.
Thomas, supra note 17, at 264 ("The data needed to support an outcomes [not
distinguished from outputs] orientation are more difficult to obtain and less reliable
than the information required by the input approach.").
53.
Levine, supra note 30, at 517 n.73. Of course, this criticism of measuring
equity by educational outputs just as easily could be levelled at measuring equity by
educational inputs. As long as inputs are equal, educational outputs and outcomes are
irrelevant.
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school-finance equity in terms of educational inputs. Although
there are shortcomings in relying on physical resource and
dollar inputs as the equity objects,' this Note will nevertheless
consider input equity in terms of per-pupil55 expenditures of
dollars or the physical inputs that dollars can buy.
3. The Equity Principles-In evaluating school-finance
equity, this Note will consider three principles of
equity-horizontal equity, vertical equity, and equality of
opportunity. The traditional notion of equity is "horizontal
equity," or equal treatment of equals.'
This principle
translates into equal finance expenditures for equally
situated students. "Vertical equity" recognizes differences
among students and requires us to treat unequal individuals
unequally.5 7 This version of equity recognizes that equal
treatment is not always fair or just for those students
"experiencing abnormal conditions such as poverty and
physical, psychological, and mental handicaps (or high costs
of living, dispersed populations, and municipal overburden)." 58 The third principle, "equality of opportunity," is a
negative condition which requires that there be no
educational input differences among students as a result of

54.
As the Montana Supreme Court phrased it, "[W ]e do not suggest that financial
considerations ... are the sole elements of a quality education or of equal educational
opportunity. There are a number of additional factors which are a significant part of
the education of each person in Montana .. . ." Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v.
State, 769 P.2d 684,691 (Mont. 1989). The court cited teachers, parental influence, and
student motivation as other factors important to a quality education. Id.
55.
Per-student equity, rather than per-school district equity, is the most
appropriate unit of measure:
The pupil unit of analysis focuses on the pupils in a state; thus, districts that
have greater numbers of pupils have a greater influence on the equity assessment
compared to smaller districts. Basically, each pupil receives equal weight in the
pupil unit of analysis. The district unit of analysis [on the other hand] ignores
district size and gives equal weight to each district in the state. This implies that
each pupil in the larger districts has a relatively smaller influence on the equity
assessment than each pupil in the smaller districts.
ROBERT BERNE & LEANNA STIEFEL, THE MEASUREMENT OF EQUITY IN SCHOOL FINANCE 59
(1984).
56.
SWANSON & KING, supranote 17, at 242; Kearney & Chen, supra note 6, at 325.
57.
SWANSON & KING, supranote 17, at 242; Kearney & Chen, supranote 6, at 325.
58.
SWANSON & KING, supranote 17, at 242. The concept of vertical equity requires
policymakers to provide additional funds for those districts that are more expensive to
run or those students who are more expensive to educate. In Michigan, the legislature
has sought to achieve vertical equity through the provision of state categorical aid
grants to support districts in providing such programs as bilingual education, gifted and
talented student programs, transportation, and special education. See infra part IV.C.
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such factors as school district wealth, geographic location,
race, or gender.5 9 Although equality of opportunity is an
appropriate principle under which equity should be
measured, this Note does not expressly evaluate equality of
educational opportunity.
Rather, the Note implicitly
considers equality of opportunity insofar as it is reflected in
measures of horizontal equity among school districts of
different wealth, location, and socioeconomic class.
To summarize, this Note defines educational equity along
several dimensions. First, the students and taxpayers are
the primary targets of equity evaluation. Second, equity will
be expressly considered under the principles of horizontal
and vertical equity. Finally, and most important, this Note
accepts equity of inputs as the most practical and appropriate object of equity analysis.

B. Does Money Make a Difference?

Some may argue that defining equity as horizontal and
vertical equality of inputs implies that providing more
inputs-more money-makes a difference in the quality of
education that our children receive. Clearly, money can buy
better physical equipment (computers, classrooms, labs, and
lockers), more teachers (decreasing the student-teacher
ratio), and perhaps better teachers (pulling educators from
other school districts and other occupations), but will these
input expenditures somehow improve the education our
children receive?
This question has troubled researchers, educators, and
policymakers ever since equality of educational opportunity
became vogue and the influential Coleman Report was issued
in 1965.6o Some empirical research finds no significant

59.
SWANSON & KING, supranote 17, at 242; Kearney & Chen, supra note 6, at 325.
60.
In response to the Civil Rights Act of 1964's mandate to investigate the extent
of inequality (based on suspect class) in America's schools, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 402,
78 Stat. 241, 247 (1964), the United States Office of Education conducted an expansive
study delving into the differences among schools and teachers. Hanushek, supra note
24, at 430-31. This study, known as the Coleman Report, cast serious doubt on the
assumptions that increased funding, better schools, and better teachers improved
student performance. Id. at 431. The report argued that the influence of the family
and the child's peers have a greater effect on outcome than those educational inputs
that money can buy. Id-
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relationship between educational inputs and outputs, 6 1 while

other studies show a correlation between particular inputs
62
which money can buy and educational achievement.
Simply, the empirical evidence does not answer the question
of whether money makes a difference reliably. Increased
educational inputs may or may not have a significant effect
on outcomes and are clearly only one factor in the student's
level of achievement, but public policy considers much more
than statistical proof. As one commentator stated, "[I]t is
simply indefensible to use the results of quantitative studies
of the relationship between school resources and student
achievement as a basis for concluding that additional funds
cannot help public school districts."' An equitable school

The Coleman Report is hardly the last word on how, or whether, school inputs affect
school outputs. Much has been written on the influence of teachers, schools, family,
and peers on a student's education. This Note does not review this literature or
attempt to make any empirical judgments on the issue. An extremely brief sample of
the academic and policy discussion of the issue includes: JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M.
MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS & AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1990); Ferguson, supra note 13, at 465;
Hanushek, supra note 24, at 423; McDermott & Klein, supra note 49, at 415; Martha
Minow, School Finance: Does Money Matter?,28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395 (1991); Richard
J. Murnane, Interpretingthe Evidence on "DoesMoney Matter?", 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
457 (1991); Mark G. Yudof, Equal EducationalOpportunity and the Courts, 51 TEX. L.
REV. 411 (1973).
61.
See, e.g., Hanushek, supra note 24, at 433-39 (discussing several studies).
The concurrence in the Milliken H decision expressed doubt as to the relationship
between dollar input and educational achievement. Milliken v. Green, 212 N.W.2d 711,
712 n.2. (Mich. 1973). This does not mean that such legislative facts are universally
accepted in our courts. More recent decisions have been impressed with the evidence
linking inputs with educational achievement. See Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 363
(N.J. 1990) ("[The evidence compels but one conclusion: the poorer the district and the
greater its need, the less the money available, and the worse the education."); see also
Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989) (noting a substantial
difference between the curricula offered in poorer and richer districts). The evidence
presented in Rose by the party challenging Kentucky's school system included "numerous depositions, volumes of oral evidence heard by the trial court, and a seemingly
[t]he overall effect of... [which
endless amount of statistical data, reports, etc. ...
was] a virtual concession that Kentucky's system of common schools [was] underfunded
and inadequate . . . ." Id. at 196-97.

62.. See, e.g., Ferguson, supra note 13, at 485 (suggesting that a strong empirical
relationship exists between student test scores and instructional inputs, including
hiring more teachers with strong literacy skills, retraining experienced teachers, and
attracting teachers with advanced training).
63.
Murnane, supra note 60, at 457. Professor Murnane further criticized empirical
studies of the education production function:
First, these studies do not adequately address serious questions of causation. For
example, many school districts have relatively high expenditure levels, including state
and federal compensatory education funds, because they serve students with low
achievement levels ....
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system and increased funds for those lagging behind in
expenditures make a difference for other reasons.
The objection to boosting revenues in underfunded schools
is clear: Why throw good money at a problem that money
might not solve? But this objection only tells half the story;
the converse is equally persuasive: Why risk something as
important as our children's future just because we are not
sure that money is the solution? It is fruitless to debate
these arguments from ignorance. Beyond empirical evidence
(might)-hurt-us"
and the "what-we-don't-know-won't
arguments, several concerns dictate the need for increased
equity of inputs in our schools.
First, money matters because we think that it matters. If
we didn't think so, wealthy school districts would not
zealously defend their property tax revenues earmarked for
their local school district. Likewise, parents and students in
underfunded districts would not litigate the issue. The fact
is that as long as we perceive money to be an important
educational input, the issue of increased educational funding
for poor districts will be at the top of the political agenda.
Without proper funding, we will perceive our poor urban and
rural schools and the products of such schools as inadequate;
and this perception might be crucial in the higher education
and job markets.6 4
This leads to the second concern-sheer fairness.6" In a
society which values giving everyone a fair shake, we should

A second concern is that the logic underlying the argument that money does not
matter does not carry over to similar studies of other organizations. The rationale
behind the conclusion that money does not affect school performance presumes waste
when school expenditures do not appear ... as having positive relationships with
student achievement.... It follows from the logic underlying this argment... that
.. organizations that do face competitive pressures... [should] show positive relationships between all resources funded ... and their measures of output.
This simply is not the nature of the evidence.
Id. at 458-59.
64.
As one high school teacher in a poorly funded urban district observed in
Jonathan Kozol's recent bestselling book Savage Inequalities:
I have four girls right now in my senior home room who are pregnant or have just
had babies. When I ask them why this happens, I am told, "Well, there's no
reason not to have a baby. There's not much for me in public school." The truth
is, that's a pretty honest answer. A diploma from a ghetto high school doesn't
count for much in the United States today.
JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES 29 (1991).
65.
See Minow, supra note 60, at 398-99.
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not tolerate significant differences, even if only perceptual
ones, in our public schools. Of course, fairness is only one of
the values at stake in the school-finance debate,"6 but it
cannot be easily overlooked.
Finally, money and equity matter in theory because the
effects of equity and money impact real life. Popular and
scholarly literature is filled with stories of schools with
inadequate and grossly unequal resources. For instance, in
his recent indictment of America's public school system,
Jonathan Kozol quoted one student in a poorly funded high
school:
"I don't go to physics class, because my lab has no equipment .... The typewriters in my typing class don't work.
The women's toilets . . . " She makes a sour face. "I'll be
honest," she says. "I just don't use the toilets. If I do, I
67
come back into class and I feel dirty."
As Professor Minow penned,
Schools are not just means to ends, but also places where
great numbers of people spend their days. This means
...
disparities don't just look bad on paper; they feel bad
in life. It is true that researchers find it difficult to measure the outputs of education, and even more difficult to
correlate those outputs with inputs. However, equality
of inputs is something we can measure. Equal inputs
also actually affect current quality of daily school experi68
ences.

II. EQuITY's IMPACT ON THE OTHER VALUES AT STAKE

Even though improving equity of inputs among Michigan's
school districts is the primary concern of this Note, it is far

66.
67.
68.

See infra part II (discussing the other values at stake).
KOZOL, supra note 64, at 30.
Minow, supra note 60, at 399.
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from the only value enmeshed in the school-finance discussion. School-finance reform affects the complicated relationships among children, parents, the community, and the state.
In the process, several deeply held values are dragged into
the debate, including liberty, localism, efficiency, quality, and
the value of education itself.6 9

A. Liberty

Equity's classic adversary, liberty, or "freedom from
coercion and the absence of external restraint," 70 is an amorphous value and probably subsumes the entire category of
local control. For purposes of this discussion, however,
liberty will be limited to the freedoms that the family
unit-and parents in particular-possess.
Parents certainly possess the freedom to bear and nurture
their children with only limited governmental constraint.7 '
In the realm of education, the nurturing influence of the
family is great. Children from families that value education
and participate in their children's intellectual development
through interaction with teachers, educational activities, and
encouragement tend to reach higher levels of educational
achievement. On the average, children from families that
are indifferent toward their children's educational development do not do well in school. 72 "By the time an infant
reaches school age, the likelihood of academic success or
failure is to a large degree determined" 73-determined by the
parental emphasis on education.
The implication is that the state can do nothing; it is
within the parents' liberty to determine the child's academic
achievement. But those who provide and support public

69.
This list is probably not complete, nor is each category self-contained. On the
contrary, there is substantial overlap, interplay, and conflict among these values.
70.
Thomas, supra note 17, at 267.
71.
See Jack B. Weinstein, Equality, Liberty, and the Public Schools, 48 U. CIN. L.
REV. 203, 220-21 (1979).
72.
Id. at 221-22.
73.
Id. at 221.
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education do not believe that one's academic future is determined exclusively at home. Public schools and the quality of
education play a role in leveling these differences, and the
quality of education arguably is affected by state funding.74
More money for property-poor school districts may mitigate
the parents' influence, but such a minor incursion on parental liberty ideally will benefit the child.

B. Local Control

Embraced by some,7' disparaged by others,76 the value of local
control pervades the school-finance debate. Freedom for local
taxpayers to choose how much they spend on educational services
has been an essential part of the Michigan school-finance scheme. 77
Any proposal to equalize funding across districts necessarily
infringes on this interest, be it legitimate or hoax. We accordingly
must ask the question: What are the primary reasons that we
Americans value local control over education?
First, local control makes it easier for parents-taxpayers to
choose an ideal package of taxes and educational services for
themselves and their families.7' For many, this is a very real
choice among the preferred services each community offers. 79
For others, however, financial, occupational, and other constraints cut against this market-based rationale.'

See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
74.
75.
E.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 47-55 (1973).
76.
E.g., Milliken v. Green (Milliken 1), 203 N.W.2d 457, 471 (Mich. 1972).
77.
See infra parts IV.C-D.
Weinstein, supra note 71, at 230.
78.
Hanushek, supra note 24, at 445-46.
79.
It may also be argued that local control actually hinders the parents' ability to
80.
choose an appropriate level of education expenditure for their children. Once a family
has made the crucial decision to locate in a community, future educational expenditures
for their children will depend on the decisions of the family's neighbors. For instance,
"[a] rural family desiring and willing to pay for an excellent education for its children
might find its neighbors preferring low taxes and low school expenditures." JAMES W.
GUTHRIE ET AL., SCHOOL FINANCE AND EDUCATION POLICY 156 (2d ed. 1988). Thus, the
family's future educational choices become quite limited. Cf Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1
v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 98 (Wash. 1978) (en banc) (declaring unconstitutional the State
of Washington's school-finance system, which was heavily dependent on local tax levies,
and stating that "[tihe special excess levy is neither dependable nor regular. It is
wholly dependent upon the whim of the electorate").
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Second, proponents argue that local control stifles the
bureaucratizing tendencies of centralization and allows
experimentation and the development of new ideas with only
the community's approval. 8 ' Innovation is fine for those
districts with the ability to implement and evaluate new
ideas, but again, the poorer districts retain only marginal or
secondary benefits from this rationale.8 2 Opponents of the
local control argument also counter that lack of control over
educational funds is not incompatible with local autonomy
with respect to other matters, such as curriculum, school
operation, and staffing decisions.'
Third, local control over school district funding provides
accountability. Localism, so the argument goes, stems the
growth of bureaucracy and allows school administrators to be
more sensitive to the community's needs."
"Experience
teaches that the system is much more responsive when a
telephone call or visit to the local school or board is an
avenue for complaints."'
But experience also shows that school boards sometimes
are controlled by constituencies, rather than by the
community as a whole. 6 Moreover, centralized financial
control does not necessarily require bureaucratization of
87
daily school operation or insensitivity to community needs.
Despite the arguments on both sides, localism is a deeply
held value in the arena of public education. Any move
toward further centralization of funding eventually must
confront the attitudinal barriers that localism erects.

81.
See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 71, at 230.
82.
Id.
83.
See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 17, at 302.
84.
Weinstein, supra note 71, at 231.
85.
Id.
86.
Id. at 231-32; see also Seth Mydans, A PoliticalProving Ground for a Rising
Religious Right, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1993, at Al (reporting that one group of Christian
fundamentalists, which garnered a majority of a suburban San Diego, California school
board in the recent election, is seeking to push its agenda in the school district but is
receiving heated public opposition).
87.
See Stephan Michelson, What Is a "Just"System for FinancingSchools?: An
Evaluationof Alternative Reforms, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 436,457-58 (1974); see

also EducationReform: MEA ChangesStop Short of Needed Reform, MICH. DAILY, Feb.
3, 1993, at 4 (arguing that a move toward centralized funding would streamline "unproductive, and often, contentious bureaucracies").
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C. Efficiency

In the modern economy, attention must be given to the
distribution and use of our scarce public resources. Because
public education is but one recipient of public funds, it is
entirely fair to ask whether we are getting the most for our
educational dollar.
As was discussed previously, ss the
empirical evidence regarding the effects of educational inputs
on educational outputs is rather muddled. Nonetheless, the
public justifiably can demand quality education for its tax
dollar, and any school-finance plan should consider ways to
improve the efficiency of the educational system.

D. Quality

Even though there is disagreement on how to define
educational quality and what produces high-quality
educational outputs, any financing scheme which promotes
equity at the perceived cost of quality should be avoided. 9 If
equal funding requires pulling down highly funded, highquality schools to some average level of funding or quality,
we should be concerned. Such a politically suspect scheme
likely would cause flight to the private school system among
those who could afford it, as the perceived quality of public
education declines. Although quality need not be sacrificed
for equity in school funding, quality can be maintained only
with an infusion of revenues to "level-up" the underfunded
districts. 9°
It is doubtless that no financing scheme can optimally
address the sometimes conflicting values of equity, liberty,
localism, efficiency, and quality. The most we can expect is
a plan with adequate trade-offs promoting equity while
sufficiently maintaining the other values.

88.
89.
90.

See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
Thomas, supra note 17, at 273-75.
Id
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III. THE FUNDAMENTAL STATE FINANCING SCHEMES

State school-finance plans can take on a multitude of forms
and hybrid models, each with its attendant strengths and
weaknesses. This Part will consider briefly the basic financing plans and how the plans affect the values at stake.
A. FoundationPlan

Even though Michigan abandoned its foundation plan (FP)
in favor of an arguably more equitable finance scheme, 9 ' FPs
are still the state-funding scheme used in a majority of the
states.92 With a FP, the state defines a minimum funding
level which provides the minimum adequate education, while
the local districts are free to raise additional revenues
through an optional levy (known as a local leeway).93 In
effect, the state and the local district form a partnership to
fund the required minimum program, with the amount of
state participation declining as local tax base wealth
increases.9 Reform usually occurs through an increase in
state aid-a "quick fix that gets the voters' attention because
the shift in funds [from wealthy to poorer districts] or
increase in spending is apparent immediately." 9'
The benefits of an FP are increased local control and
parental liberty in choosing an appropriate level of local
district funding above the foundation level. But as the
experience in Michigan shows, 96 FPs may be subject to severe
funding disparities if the guaranteed foundation level is not
set high enough to minimize the incentive for local taxpayers
in wealthier districts to boost the district's revenues above
the foundation.

91.

Hain, supra note 1, at 350 n.2, 361.
See SWANSON & KING, supra note 17, at 152 tbl. 8.1, 156.
93.
Id. at 156-59.
94.
Id. at 156-57.
95.
Robert L. Manteuffel, Comment, The Quest for Efficiency: Public School
Funding in Texas, 43 SW. L.J. 1119, 1129 (1990).
96.
See Milliken v. Green (Milliken I), 203 N.W.2d 457, 463-67 (Mich. 1972).

92.
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B. Tax Base Equalizing

For the past two decades, Michigan has finded its schools
with one of the variants of tax base equalizing (TBE)-a
guaranteed yield program." Basically, TBE plans attempt to
mitigate disparities by providing equal tax revenues for equal
tax effort. 98 TBE essentially requires the state to provide a
uniform tax base for each district and to allow the local voters
to determine the appropriate tax level without regard for the
district's wealth.9 9 Property-poor districts which have actual
property tax revenues that are less than those which a uniform
tax base would provide receive the difference from the state. In
its purest form, TBE also requires wealthy districts to
surrender their excess revenues to the state through recapture. 100
Clearly, TBE seeks a compromise between the competing
values of equity and liberty. TBE is successful in promoting
taxpayer equity and allowing local voters to retain control of
education expenditures. Nonetheless, disparities in per-pupil
spending still may exist.'0 ' Where the guaranteed tax base is
not set at a sufficiently high level to minimize the impetus to
increase local school revenues, districts which place greater
value on education still may tax themselves at higher rates and
raise more funds. Moreover, despite the ability of poor districts
to raise more dollars per mill levied, in the absence of full
recapture, property wealth still may make a difference on the
upper end, as wealthy districts are not prevented from spending
at much higher levels.

97.
See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 388.1621 (West Supp. 1992). The Michigan
Equal Yield Plan will be discussed at great length infra part I.C.
98.
See SWANSON & KING, supra note 17, at 159-67. TBE may take on several
mathematical variations-including guaranteed tax base, district power equalization,
and percentage equalization-but the basic principle remains the same: equal tax
revenue for equal tax effort. Id.
99.
Id.
100. Id- at 164-65.
101. Even with Michigan's Equal Yield Plan, per-student spending disparities are
drastic, as local taxpayers choose to tax themselves at varying rates and many districts
far exceed the guaranteed yield per mill levied, without being subject to state recapture.
See infra part IV.D.
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C. Full-State Funding

As its title indicates, full-state funding (FSF) places full
responsibility for funding education in the state's hands. All
revenues collected, whether from state or local sources, are
distributed to local school districts at equal per-student levels.
Adjustments are then made for local cost differences or special
10 2
student needs to provide vertical equity.
The premise behind FSF is "that the level of funds available
for designing educational programs should not in any way rely
upon districts' fiscal capacity or effort." 10 3 The fact that only a
few states have implemented a form of FSF' ° shows that this
is the most radical departure from traditional school-funding
mechanisms. Certainly, the goal of equality is sufficiently
attained with FSF. 0 5 For instance, California, which enacted
a mild form of FSF on the heels of the controversial Proposition
13, achieved equal funding for more than ninety percent of its
students, with the remaining differentials reduced to less than
06
two hundred dollars per student.

102. See SWANSON & KING, supra note 17, at 168-69.
103. Id. at 168.
104. Id. at 152-53 tbl. 8.1.
105. FSF has been advocated as the "appropriate policy choice for school-finance
reformers," because "[jiustice in the allocation of school resources to children is most
likely to be achieved if the distribution question is separated from questions pertaining
to revenue, thus eliminating the potential for decisions based on the desires of adult
taxpayers." Michelson, supra note 87, at 457.
106. Serrano v. Priest, 226 Cal. Rptr. 584, 613 (Ct. App. 1986). Professor Joseph
Henke describes Proposition 13 as a "radical" reform, "which limited the property tax
to one percent of full market value for all purposes throughout the state with no local
property tax override .... " Joseph T. Henke, FinancingPublic Schools in California:
The Aftermath ofSerrano v. Priest and Proposition13, 21 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 2, 23 (1986).
Professor Henke goes on to discuss the effects of FSF and Proposition 13 on the funding
of California's public schools. Id. at 1-2, 24-29.
Not everyone is satisfied with California's FSF plan, however. Despite the improvement in equity among California's schools, one recent study criticized California's
school-spending scheme because state fiscal and spending limitations constrained
California lawmakers' ability to "level-up" poorly funded schools, caused California
schools to lag behind much of the nation in school spending, and created competition
among school districts vying for precious state funds. See Lawrence 0. Picus, Cadillacs
or Chevrolets?: The Evolution of State Control over School Finance in California,17 J.
EDUC. FIN. 33, 57-59 (1991). Professor Picus concluded his research by stating, "It
appears that the increased equity the California system has achieved has also created
more Chevrolets and fewer Cadillacs among the state's schools." Id. at 59.
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The critics of FSF argue that FSF will result in centralized
control of school operations, including the selection of
This concern seems
curriculum and school materials."'
dubious, however, as there is no compelling evidence that
centralized funding leads to less control over school operations.' °s A more valid criticism of FSF is the perceived loss of
liberty for the local taxpayers and parents, as they realize that
they have little ability to influence the quality of their
children's education.
Moreover, some may fear that the
inability to raise revenues above the state mandated level will
stifle creativity and innovation in education. Whether founded
or not, such concerns should be addressed so that parents will
not take their children and exit the public school system,
furthering the perception of poor quality in public schools.
One final and practical concern with FSF may arise: local
districts could frustrate the equity goal of FSF by supplementing local school revenues with "fundraising, sale or lease
of school property, student fees, benefit assessments, developer
fees, intergovernmental transfers, and special taxes." 1 9 California's experience with FSF may be indicative. "By 1983, more
than one hundred tax-exempt, nonprofit foundations had been
organized to raise supplemental funds for particular districts." 110 Furthermore, by 1985, several wealthy districts
approved special tax assessments to bolster their districts'
coffers."' State equalization of some of these supplemental
revenues is entirely appropriate and possible,'1
but

107. See Thomas, supra note 17, at 302.
108. See id.; Michelson, supra note 87, at 457-58.
109. Henke, supra note 106, at 24, 24-31.
110. Id. at 24.
111. Id. at 30.
112. Proponents of parental liberty and local control may argue that parents and
the local community should be permitted to exercise their autonomy and contribute
their personal funds to the community's school district. But allowing such community
efforts will only thwart the purposes of providing equity. See supra parts I.A-B. By
boosting the revenues of the local school district, parents and the community again may
increase the disparities between wealthier and poorer school districts. The perceived
quality of the poorer school districts will decline, and children in the poorer districts
will feel shortchanged. Granting local tax overrides or allowing local residents to
contribute to the local school district simply will create a vicious circle of increasing
disparities and pressures to bring poorer districts on a par with wealthier districts.
Local control proponents similarly may argue that under a regime of equal funding,
the wealthier school districts will not be given an opportunity to lead the way in
innovation and raising educational standards. As a consequence, so the argument goes,
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equalization of a few of those revenue sources might be legally
questionable and practically unenforceable."1 ' Nonetheless, an
effective FSF program largely could avoid these consequences
by maintaining perceived quality in educational services. It is
clear that the challenge for FSF is to improve equity without
sacrificing perceived quality.
While FSF is an effective tool for improving equity among
students and taxpayers, fiscal constraints may tempt the
state to decrease or freeze school funding.14 State lawmakers should be wary of school spending cuts as wealthy
districts may accuse the state of "leveling-down" their
schools, and the state citizenry as a whole may cast the
blame for spending decreases on the FSF plan. But spending
decreases are not a result of a defect in FSF; rather, they
stem from statewide fiscal problems and legislative
prioritizing. FSF should not be condemned for these ubiquitous dilemmas.
In addition to FP, TBE, and FSF-the fundamental schoolfinance alternatives that affect the mix of state and local
school funds-other finance reform mechanisms that need not
alter the composition of state and local funds should be
noted. First, school choice (choice) allows the individual
child and family to choose their preferred school and spend
their allocated funding at that school. 1 5 Like FSF, choice

there will be less pressure to improve poorer school districts to keep pace with
wealthier districts. Although this criticism of an equal funding rule is not without
force, these fears can be alleviated by provision of a local enrichment fund which would
allow communities to tax themselves a few extra mills (up to a state-mandated level)
and retain the revenues from the taxes. With this enrichment fund, communities that
desire to lead the way in educational innovation will have an opportunity to do so, but
not at the expense of a drastically widening funding gap.
113. Henke, supra note 106, at 24-25.
114. See Picus, supra note 106, at 58; Neil D. Theobald & Faith Hanna, Ample
Provision for Whom?:
The Evolution of State Control over School Finance in
Washington, 17 J. EDUC.FIN. 7, 29-31 (1991) (noting the effects of Washington's shift
toward FSF and arguing for an increase in school revenues and state support).
115. See SWANSON & KING, supranote 17, at 339; see also infra note 239 (discussing
Michigan's recently enacted Schools-of-Choice program).
With the perceived decline in the educational achievement of America's students,
market-based reform such as choice recently has become a viable and attractive
alternative. See CHUBB & MOE, supra note 60, at 215-29. Choice has also received
national attention as former President George Bush endorsed a choice program that
would offer families vouchers to send their children to public or private schools, while
President Bill Clinton supports a public school choice policy. See Susan Chira, Furor
Over 'Choice',N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1992, at B10; Charles A. Radin, Report Blasts Mass.
School Choice Program, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 26, 1992, at 1.
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programs ideally provide state-equalized funds for each
student and allow parents the liberty to choose the appropriate school for their child.
Because choice programs
successfully may coexist with FSF or TBE (so long as
revenues are distributed directly to students so they may
spend their allocations at their chosen schools), this Note will
only consider choice programs insofar as they differ from,
hinder, or enhance school-finance plans.
Second, school district reorganization and consolidation are
also feasible school-finance reforms.'
Setting aside the
political and logistical difficulties of implementing adequate
redistricting proposals, redistricting would fail to enhance
the values at stake sufficiently. Taxpayer and student equity
could be improved marginally, but significant differences
might remain among the redrawn districts.
Moreover,
parents might feel even less able to influence their child's
education with an added tax dollar as redrawn districts
necessarily would be larger and arguably more bureaucratic.
Granted, redistricting certainly would provide a quick fix and
an adequate short-term solution to some of Michigan's most
glaring equity problems, but the threat of only limited and
local effectiveness and the potential flight of the wealthy cut
against the long-term efficacy of such a solution.

IV. Two

DECADES OF SCHOOL-FINANCE
REFORM IN MICHIGAN

Throughout the country, the early 1970s were witness to a
wave of school-finance reform initiatives, as reformers sought
change in the courtrooms and the state legislatures." 7

Support for choice is far from universal, however. The Carnegie Foundation for the
Advancement of Teaching released a report in November 1992 arguing that choice is
not a panacea-without proper safeguards, it primarily benefits children of bettereducated parents, does not necessarily improve student performance, and actually may
widen the gap between rich and poor districts. THE CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR TIig
ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, SCHOOL CHOICE 14,16,20,25 (1992) [hereinafter CARNEGIE
FOUNDATION]; see also Susan Chira, Research Questions Effectiveness of Most SchoolChoice Programs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1992, at Al (discussing the Carnegie
Foundation's report and the effectiveness of school choice programs).
116. Thomas, supra note 17, at 306.
117. See generally Symposium, Future Directionsfor School Finance Reform, 38
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 293 (1974).
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Michigan was no exception. In 1971, then-Governor William
Milliken, seeking to stake out the political high ground,
challenged Michigan's system of school finance in state
court. 118 Although reform through the courts was not
forthcoming,"' the state legislature changed the schoolfunding rules 20 and has continued down the path of reform
ever since.

A. School-FinanceLitigation
Although school-finance litigation has achieved some measure
of success in other states,' 2' litigators in Michigan have had

118. Milliken v. Green (Milliken1), 203 N.W.2d 457 (Mich. 1972), vacated,(Milliken
I/), 212 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973); see also Hain, supra note 1, at 351-52 (describing the
background behind the filing of the suit).
119. Milliken 11, 212 N.W.2d at 718-21.
120. Hain, supra note 1, at 360-65.
121. To date, 10 states have found their school-financing schemes unconstitutional
based on state Equal Protection Clause or Education Article claims. See DuPree v.
Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Ark. 1983); Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929,
952-57 (Cal. 1976) (en banc); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 372-76 (Conn. 1977);
Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 202-13 (Ky. 1989); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 689-91 (Mont. 1989), modified, 784
P.2d 412 (Mont. 1990); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 277-85, 290-96 (N.J.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 394,
398 (Tex. 1989); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 85-87, 90-97 (Wash.
1978) (en banc); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 864-78 (W. Va. 1979); Washakie
County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 320-24, 332-36 (Wyo.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 824 (1980).
School-finance reform litigators have used two basic constitutional strategies to
challenge state school-funding schemes in state courts. Some litigators have had
success in ai-guing that state funding schemes violated the state's Equal Protection
Clause. See, e.g., Horton, 376 A.2d at 374-76 (finding education to be a fundamental
right in Connecticut and striking down the state's school funding scheme on state equal
protection grounds). Other school finance litigators have successfully challenged state
school-funding schemes under the state's Education Article. See, e.g., Edgewood Indep.
Sch. Dist., 777 S.W.2d at 369-97 (finding that the Texas public school system, which
was characterized by gross inequalities and inadequacies, failed to satisfy the efficiency
requirement of the Texas Constitution's education provision). See generally Molly
McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School FinanceReform Litigation, 28 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 307 (1991) (analyzing and arguing for the use of education clauses in
school-finance reform litigation).
The principal U.S. Supreme Court case regarding school funding and the Fourteenth
Amendment is San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
In Rodriguez, the plaintiffs argued that the Texas school-funding scheme violated the
federal Equal Protection Clause because differences in per-student funding denied
students of poorly funded schools their fundamental right to an education, id. at 11-14,
and because the Texas funding scheme denied poor people the benefits of wealth-related
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little luck in pushing reform through the courts. Milliken v.
Green,122 Michigan's key school-finance case, was the product of
political posturing;' nevertheless, it remains the Michigan
Supreme Court's only statement on the constitutional
requirements for Michigan public school finance in the last two
decades.
1. The Climate of Reform in 1971-In 1971, Republican
Governor William Milliken already had established himself as
an education-minded politician and wanted to further his
position as an education reformer with the Michigan
electorate.124
Particularly, Milliken sought to change
Michigan's highly inequitable foundation plan, but had little
luck in prodding the legislature toward action.'
After seeing
reform activity in the courts of other states, 26 Milliken decided
to bypass the legislature and seek school equity in the courts.
At the same time, Michigan's Attorney General, Frank
Kelley, who reportedly was eyeing a possible run at one of
Michigan's United States Senate seats, also saw an opportunity
to gather political steam and equalize public school funding
through the courts. 1 27 Upon learning of each others' desire to
challenge Michigan's school-finance system, Milliken and Kelley
jointly filed a complaint against the State Treasurer, Allison

educational opportunities. Id. at 16. The Court did not accept the argument that there
is a fundamental right to an education because this right was not "explicitly or
implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." Id. at 33-34. The Court was unwilling to
infer a constitutional right to an education from the relationship between education and
the exercise of the rights to vote and speak. Id. at 35-37. The Court also found no
suspect class affected by the school-finance statute. A class of parents of school-age
children was not a suspect class, reasoned the Court, because it lacked the "traditional
indicia of suspectness: [it was] not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such
a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process." Id. at 28. Applying a rational basis standard, the Court easily found that the
Texas system was rationally related to the state's interest in local control of schools.
Id. at 49, 55.
122. (Milliken I), 203 N.W.2d 457 (Mich. 1972), vacated, (Milliken II), 212 N.W.2d
711 (Mich. 1973).
123. See Hain, supra note 1, at 351.
124. Id.
125. Id. Much of Milliken's concern about the state of inequality in Michigan's
schools may have stemmed from the legislatively commissioned Thomas Report, which
exhaustively studied equity in Michigan's public schools in the late 1960s. J. ALAN
THOMAS, SCHOOL FINANCE AND EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN MICHIGAN (1968).
126. See Hain, supra note 1, at 351 (stating that Milliken, after seeing the positive
results in California school-finance litigation in the Serrano v. Priestcase, felt the same
could be accomplished through the Michigan courts).
127. Id.
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Green, and three wealthy, suburban Detroit school districts,
alleging that Michigan's school-finance system violated both the
Michigan and United States Constitutions. 12
The case was an oddity. The logical defendants in a school
finance lawsuit, the Governor and Attorney General, were
plaintiffs; and the traditional defender of state law, the
Attorney General, attacked Michigan's law. In addition to the
peculiar posturing in the case, several factors muddled the suit
in the public eye. These factors included a district court ruling
ordering interdistrict busing as a desegregation remedy' 29 and
voter rejection of a constitutional amendment in Michigan to
enact a FSF system for Michigan's public schools." 0
The plaintiffs' complaint alleged that Michigan's deductible
millage system denied equal protection to students in propertypoor school districts under both the United States' 31 and
Michigan 32 Constitutions."a Upon the Governor's request, the
Michigan Supreme Court certified several gubernatorial
questions for review and directed the trial court to expedite its
hearings."3
The questions certified by the Michigan Supreme Court
differed from the allegations made in the original complaint;
the Governor now wanted the court to consider the unequal
revenue-raising ability per student, rather than the unequal
expenditure per student, as the constitutionally infirm effect
of the funding rules.3 5 Perhaps the intervening defeat of the
FSF proposal prompted the switch, because a constitutional
ruling dictating equal expenditure likely would have required
FSF-a politically unpopular outcome. 3 ' After the expedited
ninety-day hearing in the trial court, the supreme court

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Milliken I, 203 N.W.2d at 459; Hain, supra note 1, at 351.
Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
See Hain, supra note 1, at 351.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
Michigan's Equal Protection Clause provides:

No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws; nor shall any person
be denied the enjoyment of his civil or political rights or be discriminated against
in the exercise thereof because of religion, race, color or national origin. The
legislature shall implement this section by appropriate legislation.
MICH. CONST. art. I, § 2.

133.
134.
135.
136.

See Hain, supra note 1, at 352-53.
Id. at 353.
Milliken I, 203 N.W.2d at 460-61 (stating the certified question).
Hain, supra note 1, at 353.
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on the certified question 137 and
heard arguments
subsequently issued its opinion on December 29, 1972.1"
2. Milliken I-Even though the court would vacate its
Milliken I opinion only a year after handing it down, several
of the issues discussed by Justice G. Mennen Williams'
majority opinion are worth considering.
From the start, the court made it clear that its opinion did
not hinge on a finding that educational inputs affect the
quality of education by stating, "'The Michigan Supreme
Court ... is presented with unrebutted evidence which
destroys plaintiffs' assumption that the quality of a child's
education is a function of the wealth of the school district in
which he resides. '""'3 9 Rather, the court narrowed the issue
to whether "substantial INEQUALITY OF MAINTENANCE
AND SUPPORT OF THE ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY
SCHOOLS, DENY the equal protection of the [Michigan]
laws." 4 °
In finding the state school-financing scheme unconstitutional, the court reasoned that the Michigan Constitution's
Education Article, which provided that "[t]he legislature shall
maintain and support a system of free public elementary and
coupled with the state's Equal
secondary schools,"'
Protection clause, 142 required the state to provide financial
support and maintenance to its schools." 3 Finding that the
state had the primary responsibility for financing public
schools,' 4 4 the court took note of the evidence indicating wide

137. Id at 353-54.
138. Milliken I, 203 N.W.2d at 457; Hain, supra note 1, at 354.
139. Milliken I, 203 N.W.2d at 460 (quoting Brief of Defendant Bloomfield Hills
School District at 24).
140.

Id.

141. MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2.
Education Article provides:

In relevant part, the Michigan Constitution's

Sec. 1. Religion, morality and knowledge being necessary to good government and
the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.
Sec. 2. The legislature shall maintain and support a system of free public
elementary and secondary schools as defined by law. Every school district shall
provide for the education of its pupils without discrimination as to religion, creed,
race, color or national origin.
MICH. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1, 2.

142.
143.
144.

MICH. CONST. art. I, § 2.
Milliken 1, 203 N.W.2d at 460-61.
Id, at 461-62.
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disparities under the deductible millage formula caused by
With the
unequal property values across districts. 145
evidence established, the court turned to its equal protection
analysis.
It is noteworthy that the court found the deductible millage
formula unconstitutional under both a "rationality" test and
a "close scrutiny" test. 146 To apply close scrutiny, the court
must have found either that there was a fundamental
interest affected or that a classification inherently was suspect. 4 7 The court found both. Relying on both the Michigan
Constitution's Education Article and Michigan Supreme
Court precedent, the court concluded that education is "a
fundamental interest under the Michigan Constitution
requiring close scrutiny of legislative classifications concerning the distribution of educational resources." 4 ' The court
also recognized wealth as a suspect classification and
ironically cited several pre-San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez141 United States Supreme Court cases
for support."50 Applying close scrutiny, the court then
rejected the defendants' argument that "local control" was a
compelling state interest which would justify a wealth
and affect the fundamental interest of educaclassification
151
tion.
Even under a rationality test, the court found "no logical
connection between the asserted justification of'local control'
and the amount of school funds the state distributes to or
permits to be expended in a school district based solely on the
fortuitous circumstance that the district has more or less
valuable properties per pupil within its borders." 2 Particularly interesting was the court's hostility toward the recognized value of local control in education:

145. Id. at 462-67.
146. Id. at 468-71.
147. Id. at 468.
148. Id. at 469.
149. 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that the Texas school-funding system was rationally
related to the state's interest in local control of its schools and therefore did not violate
the Equal Protection Clause).
150. Milliken 1, 203 N.W.2d at 469-70 (citing McDonald v. Board of Election
Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969), Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,
668, 670 (1966)).
151. Id. at 470.
152. Id. at 471.
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[T]he seemingly plausible argument of local control to
permit school districts to opt for the greener pastures of
education is really a heavy yoke for all school districts to
bear and adds up to the major share of the State's
burden to "maintain and support" free public schools.
For the poorer school districts it is a hoax that they can
follow the richer school districts into the green pastures.
All in all, this Court finds no rationality justifying the
substantial inequalities found.' 53
But the Governor's victory was short-lived, as the Michigan
Supreme Court vacated its decision a year later in a brief
and cryptic order.154
3. Milliken I-Much had changed since Governor
Milliken brought the action challenging Michigan's school
finance law-the legislature had enacted a form of TBE,'5 5
and the Unites States Supreme Court handed down San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.5 '
Although the court dismissed the Governor's suit and vacated
its Milliken I opinion on the grounds that the Governor's
157
requests for certification had been "improvidently granted,"
it seemed apparent that the case had become moot, and the
court wanted to wash its hands of the political ramifications
of its prior decision.' 5 8
Although the majority simply ordered dismissal of the case,
Justices Kavanagh and Levin felt compelled to discuss the
merits of the case in a concurring opinion.' 9 Because later
Michigan Appellate Court cases have used reasoning similar
to that in the concurrence in other education-related lawsuits, 60 the opinion warrants discussion.
•From the outset,- the concurring justices made it clear that
they were faced with "generalized arguments concerning the
nature of educational opportunity in [the] State," and that

153. Id.
154. Milliken v. Green (Milliken II), 212 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973), vacating
(Milliken 1), 203 N.W.2d 457 (Mich. 1972).
155. Hain,supra note 1, at 360-61.
156. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
157. Milliken 11, 212 N.W.2d at 711.
158. See Hain, supra note 1, at 359.
159. Milliken H, 212 N.W.2d at 711-12 (T.G. Kavanagh & Levin, JJ., concurring).
160. See, e.g., Palmer v. Bloomfield Hills Bd. of Educ., 417 N.W.2d 505, 506-07
(Mich. Ct. App. 1987); East Jackson Pub. Sch. v. State, 348 N.W.2d 303, 305-06 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1984); Sutton v. Cadillac Area Pub. Sch., 323 N.W.2d 582, 584 (Mich. Ct. App.
1982).
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they were not presented with any "concrete" claim of the
state's denial of any "judicially enforceable right to an
education [a student] may have under [Michigan's] Constitution."'6 1 Such a statement implied that there may be constitutional rights to an education in Michigan, but that these
rights do not include the right to equal tax-raising ability per
student, nor are they spelled out in the opinion. The opinion
hinted only at a minimum educational right, stating, "All
that can properly be expected of the state is that it maintain
and support a system of public schools that
furnishes
16 2
adequate educational services to all children."
The concurring justices then proceeded to the merits of the
claim that Michigan's school-financing scheme denied equal
protection to students in property-poor districts. Noting first
that the Rodriguez decision held that the "new" strict
scrutiny test did not apply to school-funding legislation
essentially similar to that in Michigan," the concurrence
considered the plaintiffs' state equal protection claim.
Because the "Michigan Constitution 'secures the same right
of equal protection' as is secured by the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,""s the concurrence
adopted reasoning similar to that of the Rodriguez court and
refused to find any "suspect classifications" or "fundamental
interests" enmeshed with the state school-financing legisla65
tion. 1
The concurrence argued that the type of wealth discrimination inherent in the Michigan school-finance system did
not violate any constitutional directive. 6 6 It did imply that
certain forms of wealth discrimination might be constitutionally questionable, such as "those situations in which
indigents are totally excluded from public benefits by their
inability to pay." 6 ' But the court made it clear that "[t]he
[Michigan] Constitution does not forbid disparities in
wealth,""s and that "[a] rule requiring government in the
distribution of benefits, such as education, to take into

161. Milliken H, 212 N.W.2d at 713 (T.G. Kavanagh & Levin, JJ., concurring).
162. Id. at 720 (emphasis added).
163. Id. at 713-14.
164. Id- at 714 (quoting Fox v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 153 N.W.2d 644, 647
(Mich. 1967)).
165. Id at 714-21.
166. Id. at 716-18, 21.
167. Id. at 716.
168. Id. at 718.
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account and alleviate all differences in ability to pay would
work a revolutionary change in the system of furnishing
benefits."6 9
Without defining educational opportunity as being dependent upon educational inputs or outputs, 170 the concurrence
then found that the Michigan Constitution did not contain a
fundamental right to equality in the ability to fund
education. 17' The constitutional mandate to "'maintain and
support a system of free public ... schools'"'7 did not provide
such a fundamental interest. 173
Nor did the evidence
presented show any "constitutionally significant" inequalities
in the provision of educational services. 74 The concurrence
simply found that "the state's obligation to provide a system
of public schools is not the same as the claimed
obligation to
175
provide equality of educational opportunity. "
Because the Milliken II majority refused to address the
merits of the plaintiffs' claim, the precedential value of the
concurring opinion is unclear. Certainly the concurrence's
reasoning would disallow constitutional challenges to any
school-finance system which provides disparate revenues
based on local property values; and subsequent lower court
opinions seemingly have followed the concurrence's arguments.
4. The Judicial Aftermath of Milliken v. Green-In the
wake of the Governor's lawsuit, the legislature enacted a
mild form of district power equalizing which was intended to
lessen the disparities in interdistrict school funding.1 76 Yet
the disparities apparently persisted and reformers challenged
Michigan's new Equal Yield Plan in state court.
In East Jackson Public Schools v. State,177 the plaintiffs,
twenty Michigan public school districts and one student from
each district, argued that (1) unequal funding of public
schools violated the Michigan Constitution's Education
Article, (2) the interaction of the Education Article and the

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

I& at 716-17.
Id at 716.
Id. at 716-21.
Id. at 717 (quoting MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2).
Id at 717-18.
Id at 719.
lI at 720.
See Hain, supra note 1, at 361.
348 N.W.2d 303 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
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state Equal Protection Clause created a constitutional right
to equality of educational financial support which is denied
by the equal yield plan, and (3) the Michigan school-funding
system denied equal protection to the individual plaintiffs-

students. 178
The Michigan Court of Appeals dismissed all three allegations, following the reasoning of the Milliken H concurrence. 7 9 Even though the plaintiffs attempted to distinguish
their claim from that of the plaintiffs in Milliken I and
Milliken II by characterizing their position as concerned with
equality of educational support (tracking the Education
Article's language), rather than equality of educational
opportunity, the court found the claims to be
Without
identical-equality of funding per student."s
explicitly relying on the Milliken II concurrence, the court
then agreed with the opinion's reasoning and found no
obligation to provide equal funding per student under the
Education Article or the Equal Protection Clause.'
Although not a school-finance case, an earlier court of
appeals decision, Sutton v. Cadillac Area Public Schools,'8
apparently found that education was not a fundamental right
under Michigan's constitution. The plaintiffs sought an order
requiring free transportation to and from a public school and
argued that failure to do so amounted to a denial of a
fundamental right to public education and discrimination on
Noting that
the basis of a suspect classification-wealth."
equal protection in Michigan generally is coextensive with
federal constitutional protection, the court, relying on Rodriguez, found no fundamental right or suspect classification.'"
Then, applying the rational basis test to the decision not to
supply free busing to the plaintiffs, the court found no denial
of equal protection."

178. Id. at 304-05.
179. Id. at 305-06.
180. Id. at 305.
181. Id.
182. 323 NW.2d 582 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
183. Id at 583-84.
184. Id. at 584.
185. Id. at 584-85. In another case not involving school finance, a Michigan
appellate court, though not directly relying on the Milliken II concurrence, found no
fundamental right to education in the Michigan Constitution. See Palmer v. Bloomfield
Hills Bd. of Educ., 417 N.W.2d 505, 506-07 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987). Noting that the
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Finally, it should be noted that the Michigan Supreme
Court had another opportunity to put some substance into
Michigan's Education Article in the 1985 case of Durant v.
State Board of Education," but refused to consider whether

the application of the state school-aid formula to the
plaintiffs-school districts violated the Education Article.
Durant was a consolidation of two cases in which the
plaintiffs-school districts alleged that the decrease in state
school aid which they suffered under the state school-aid
formula violated Michigan's Constitution. 8 7 Writing for the
court, Justice Patricia Boyle did not consider the
constitutionality of the reduction in state aid under the
Education Article. Rather, she held that (1) the reduction of
unrestricted state aid under the state aid formula did not
violate the Headlee Amendment to the Michigan Constitution"s which prohibited the reduction of state financing for
necessary costs of services required of local government by
state law; 1' (2) the reduction of categorical state aid toward
costs of state mandated activities violated the Headlee
Amendment; 90 and (3) the Headlee Amendment required that
the state need only maintain the overall percentage
allotment of the state budget for all units of local government, taken as a group, at the 1978-79 levels.1 9 '
Unsatisfied with the Durant majority's failure to address
the state school-aid formula's constitutionality under the
Education Article, the author of Milliken I, Chief Justice G.
Mennen Williams, dissented.1 92 Chief Justice Williams
argued that because the trial judge in the consolidated
Waterford v. Board of Education case found that the reduc-

tion in state school aid jeopardized

students' college

Michigan Constitution affords the same equal protection rights as the U.S. Constitution, the court found that "[tihe mere fact that the Michigan Constitution of 1963
mentions education, while the federal constitution does not, provides no justification
for abandoning past decisions and holding education to be a fundamental right under
Michigan's constitution." Id. at 507 (footnote omitted).
186. 381 N.W.2d 662 (Mich. 1985).
187. Id. at 666.
188. MICH. CONST. art. IX, §§ 25-31.
189. Durant, 381 N.W.2d at 671.
190. Id. at 674.
191. Id. Justice Boyle also refused to consider whether the school-aid formula
violated Michigan's Equal Protection Clause because the issue was raised for the first
time on appeal. Id. at 675.
192. Id. at 675 (Williams, C.J., dissenting).
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admission prospects and their opportunities to enter
apprenticeships after school, the operation of the state
school-aid formula failed to "support a system of free public
education" as required by the Education Article.' 93 Despite
the reasoned arguments in the Chief Justice's dissent, which
discussed the history of the Education Article and the state's
education policy, the majority's decision leaves no guidance
as to the substance behind the Education Article.
The upshot of these cases is apparent: Michigan courts
have been unwilling to interpret the state constitution as
providing a right to equal per-student funding, or even equal
per-student ability to raise educational funds. Although
further constitutional litigation clearly is not foreclosed in
the school-finance arena, 9 4 reformers have been forced to
seek legislative action as the more effective route to
educational equity.
B. Lansing's Response: Reform Through the Legislature

While the Governor attempted judicial reform through his
suit against the State Treasurer, others sought school-finance
reform through the legislature. With a statewide initiative,
reformers attempted to install a FSF plan which would
provide centralized state financing of the public schools, a
graduated state income tax to support the increased costs of

193. Id. at 678 (Williams, C.J., dissenting).
194. As these cases indicate, constitutional litigation over finance equity issues is
hampered severely in Michigan because of its relatively weak Education Article, which
does not provide a sturdy peg on which to hang a constitutional claim. See supra note
141. One observer even noted that Michigan's Education Article provides "little basis
for claiming that a minimum standard of educational quality is guaranteed." McUsic,
supra note 121, at 338.
Nonetheless, litigation-minded reformers may retain some hope in the current
constitution after the Milliken II decision. Because the court did not reach the merits
of the claim in Miliken II, it is unclear what the precedential value of the decision may
be. Moreover, even the concurrence, with its vague references to "adequate" education
under the Michigan Constitution, at least may provide support for claims that
educational services in a particular district have fallen below some constitutionally
minimum standard.
Finally, reformers could attempt to amend Michigan's Education Article to provide
equality and quality in the public schools. Such a beefed-up constitutional provision
would provide the necessary support for equity claims. In fact, one group of reformers,
Knowledge Is Democracy's Safeguard (KIDS), has been quite active (albeit, so far
unsuccessfully) in seeking a constitutional amendment of the Education Article to
provide a stronger claim for equity in Michigan's schools. Interview with C. Philip
Kearney, Professor of Education, University of Michigan, in Ann Arbor, Michigan (Nov.
17, 1992).
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the plan, and a small enrichment millage which would allow
local districts to levy a few additional mills if desired. 195
Despite sponsorship from the Michigan Education Association and gubernatorial endorsement, the initiative failed
miserably.'9 6
In the public eye, the FSF proposal had several fatal flaws.
First, voters and politicians were concerned with the progressive income tax proposal. Michigan has a state income tax,
but it is constitutionally limited to a flat rate.'9 7 Republicans
opposed a graduated rate structure, while Democrats feared
that passage of FSF without passage of the tax initiative
would transfer much of the funding responsibility from
industry to wage earners and consumers.'
Moreover, many
voters feared a loss of local control over their school districts. 99 And, as if that were not enough, Judge Stephen
Roth's desegregation order in Bradley v. Milliken 20 0 pounded
the final nail in FSF's coffin. Many voters who opposed the
interdistrict busing remedy confused that issue with the FSF
proposal, while more savvy opponents of interdistrict
desegregation opposed FSF because they felt that passage of
a centralized funding plan would make it easier to implement
the remedy than if the United States Supreme Court, on
appeal, faced a patchwork of tax bases, millage rates, and
school expenditure levels.20 '
Despite the defeat of FSF, reformers in the Michigan
legislature remained undaunted. With bipartisan support in
the Senate, a TBE plan, dubbed the Bursley Act, 0 2 was
passed in 1973 following the Michigan Supreme Court's
withdrawal of its Milliken I decision.0 3 Lauded for its
taxpayer equity and reduction in per-student revenue
disparity attributes, °4 the basic function of the Bursley Act

195.
196.

Hain, supra note 1, at 360.
Id.

197.

MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 7.

198. Hain, supra note 1, at 360.
199. Id.
200. 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971), afl'd, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973), affd
as amended, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
201. Hain, supra note 1, at 360.
202. 1973 Mich. Pub. Acts 101.
203. See Hain, supra note 1, at 360-61.
204. See id. at 361-64. Upon signing the Bursley Act, Governor Milliken stated, "It
is wrong that the wealth of a school district should affect either the quality of education
a child receives or the tax rates paid by his parents and neighbors. This act will
virtually eliminate property tax base wealth as a factor in school finance among district&" GENE CAEsAR ET AL., NEW EQUITY IN MICHIGAN SCHOOL FINANCE: THE STORY OF THE
BURSLEY ACT 26 (1974).

230

University of Michigan Journalof Law Reform

[VOL. 26:1

was to "equalize[] operating revenues raised per pupil per
mill in all but the wealthiest of districts."2 5
Initially, the Bursley Act's formula for the distribution of
state school revenue guaranteed each district a yield of
thirty-eight dollars per student per mill up to twenty-two
mills. 2 6 To put it differently, the Bursley Act provided each
district with the revenue-raising power of a district with a
SEV of $38,000 per student.2 7 Additionally, the Act partially
equalized revenues for retiring bond indebtedness and capital
outlays. 2 8 The Bursley Act was not, however, a pure TBE
plan, as it provided no mechanism for recapture of excess tax
revenues in wealthy school districts. 20 9 Because the Act is
functionally similar to the current State School Aid Act,210
this Note will discuss the details of the Bursley Act in
conjunction with the current school-finance package.

C. School Finance Today

Since the passage of the Bursley Act, school-finance
reforms largely have been in the form of modifications to the
TBE plan and provision of relief for Michigan's taxpayers.

Professor Elwood Hain, co-counsel for the intervenors in Milliken v. Green, wrote,
"Quite clearly, school finance will not hereafter be a function of the real property wealth
of a district except in [a] handful of districts," Hain, supra note 1, at 362, but qualified
his remarks by saying, "Ithe [Bursley Act] is not perfect: it favors high income districts
and districts with few competing demands for tax dollars." I& at 364.
205. Id- at 361.
206. 1973 Mich. Pub. Acts 101.
207. The basic formula for distribution of state aid under the Bursley Act was:
S = T * ($38,000 - SEV per student)
where

S = state aid per student
SEV per student = state equalized valuation per student
T = millage rate
$38,000 = guaranteed valuation per student

1973 Mich. Pub. Acts 101. In Michigan, the property tax base for purposes of ad
valorem taxation is assessed at 50% of its true cash value and equalized across units
at the county and state levels to produce the district's SEV. See MICH. CONST. art. X,
§ 3; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 209.4, 211-234 (West 1990); Hain, supra note 1, at 350
n.4.
208. 1973 Mich. Pub. Acts 101.
209. Hain, supra note 1, at 361.
210. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 388.1601-.1772 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992).
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Significant among the legislative and voter initiatives were
the passage of Michigan's Equal Yield Plan 2 11 (which replaced
the Bursley Act, but left its essential characteristics intact),
the defeat of an increased sales tax referendum (which would
have earmarked additional sales tax revenues for the public
school system),2 12 and the recent passage of a commercial and
plan (pejoratively
industrial property-tax-base-sharing
referred to as the "Robin Hood" plan).21 3 What follows is a
discussion of how Michigan's State School Aid Act works in
practice.
The Michigan State School Aid Act 214 (the Act) basically is
a guaranteed yield variant of TBE, which provides a
minimum yield per mill of tax but neither recaptures fully
excess yield, nor equalizes the yield across all districts.1 5
Moreover, the Act provides special and categorical grants for
certain programs to promote vertical equity. 2 6 Finally, the
necessary adjustments for municipal overburAct makes
21 7
den.
To receive state dollars for general-purpose school expenditures, a school must meet the qualifications for the membership formula grant. 218 In the 1991-92 school year, all
districts meeting certain quality, class-size, and graduation
and class incentives were guaranteed a yield of $335 per
student plus $94.38 per student for each mill of operating tax
levied. 219 Those districts without sufficient tax bases to
generate the minimum yield are deemed "in-formula"20 and

211. Id. § 388.1621.
212. See Manteuffel, supra note 95, at 1135 n.165.
213. 1991 Mich. Pub. Acts 108 (codified as amended at MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
99 388.752-.753 (West Supp. 1992)); see Pluta, supra note 6.
214. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 388.1601-.1772 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992).
215. Id. § 388.1621.
216. See infra notes 222-31 and accompanying text.
217. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 388.1625 (West Supp. 1992).
218. See id. § 388.1621.
219. Id. The guaranteed yield per student is calculated as:
Y = $335 + ($94.38 * T)

where

Y = yield per student
T = tax (millage) rate.

The $335 figure is comprised of a $266 per-pupil base allowance, plus $30 per pupil
for meeting graduation and class incentives, $14 per pupil for meeting class-size incentives, and $25 per pupil for meeting quality incentives. Id.
220. Id. § 388.1621(4)(a).
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qualify for state membership aid.221 Because the state does
not fully recapture excess revenues, or cap school operating
millage rates, the Act allows districts to keep any excess
revenues generated by taxing property assessed at a higher
SEV than the guaranteed minimum and to set their millage
rates at the community's desired level.
State categorical grants are provided by the Act to both "informula" and "out-of-formula"m districts to provide vertical
equity and support programs for, among other things, foreign
student impact, 3 bilingual education, 224 gifted and talented
students,' special education, 22s vocational education," and
transportation. 2m Although out-of-formula districts receive
state categorical aid under the Act, the state recaptures some
of the categorical dollars to which an out-of-formula district
may be entitled based on a sliding scale related primarily to
the district's wealth. 9 The state may recapture up to
niiety-nine percent of a district's categorical aid under the
Act," ° but because there is a cap on the aggregate amount
recaptured, 1 there is a significant reduction of the amount
actually recaptured in practice. 2
One form of categorical aid which deserves special attention is the provision for municipal overburden, which allocates additional revenues to those districts in which tax rates
for nonschool purposes are high relative to the state average.'
The nonschool tax rate is a figure reflecting the
additional expenses which stem from population density,

221.

Id.

State contribution is calculated as:
S =

S =
state contribution
T=
tax (millage) rate
SEV = state equalized valuation per student

where

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

($335 + ($94.38 * T)) - (SEV * T)

Id.
IdId.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id

§
§
§
§
§
§
§
Id. §

388.1621(4)(c).
388.1629.
388.1641.
388.1647.
388.1651.
388.1661.
388.1671.
388.1621(5)-(8).

Id.
Id. § 388.1621(8).
See KEARNEY, supra note 28, at 17.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 388.1625 (West Supp. 1992).
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population growth, and lower-income population, including
police and fire protection, street and road maintenance, and
increased administrative expenses. If the nonschool tax rate
exceeds a statutory level, the Act will kick in categorical
funds to defray nonschool expenses.'
In 1991, the Michigan legislature enacted the property-taxbase-sharing provision 235 in an attempt to improve equity
among the state's school districts. Basically put, the taxbase-sharing plan takes half of the new commercial and
industrial- property-tax-growth revenues from out-of-formula
school districts and sends the revenues to districts with low
property tax incomes. 23
Although it is too early to
determine how far this share-the-wealth plan may go toward
reducing inequity, optimistic early estimates indicate a shift
of $350 million to $400 million from wealthier to poorer
school districts over the first ten years.237 Opponents ofrthe
legislation contended that such a wealth transfer would be
minimal, amounting to twenty-three dollars per student, in
those districts that will receive funds under the legislation'.'
And, as the next section makes clear, twenty-three dollars
per student will not go very far toward reducing the large
spending gap between the state's wealthiest and poorest
school districts. 9

234. Id.
235. 1991 Mich. Pub. Acts 108 (codified as amended at MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 380.752-.753 (West Supp. 1992)). Although the legislature has enacted the tax-basesharing plan, implementation of the plan has been blocked in the courts. See infra note
259.
236. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 380.752-.753 (West Supp. 1992).
237. See Pluta, supra note 6.
238. Id.
239. Michigan recently enacted a provision requiring intradistrict school choice for
any district that wants to receive funds under the State School Aid Act. See 1991 Mich.
Pub. Acts 118 (codified as amended at MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 388.1623a (West Supp.
1992)). The school-choice provision requires that "each district that operates more than
one school offering instruction at the same grade level shall establish a schools of choice
planning committee by not later than November 15, 1991," develop an adequate school
choice plan not later than April 1, 1992, and implement the plan for the 1992-93 school
year unless the district appropriately is exempted from the school-choice provision. Id.
The school choice provision also requires that the intradistrict school choice program
include, among other things, the following: provision of information and adequate
counseling about the program to parents and students, a plan to ensure transportation
to the student's school of choice, a plan to ensure that each student has an equal
opportunity for enrollment within the open enrollment availability of a particular
school, a plan to ensure that the district maintains all existing standards of racial and
ethnic integration within the district, and a provision that the district is not required
to force students from neighborhood schools. Id.
Michigan's school choice program is not as comprehensive as the interdistrict
programs in other states, see Chira, supra note 115, and is only in its infant stage at
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D. Equity Under the State School Aid Act

When passed, the Michigan Equal Yield Plan was hailed as
the mechanism that would improve per-student spending
equity among the schools and help guarantee taxpayers more
equal revenues for equal tax effort." ° Two decades later, it
is time to assess equity in Michigan public school finance and
determine whether the Equal Yield Plan met its initial
objectives and satisfies the primary concern of this
Note-equity. Relying heavily on the work of Philip Kearney
and David Anderson of the University of Michigan School of
Education, this Section considers horizontal equity among
two equity targets-students and taxpayers-and concludes
that not only do severe inequities still exist, but there also
has been a decline in equity among students and taxpayers
under the Equal Yield Plan.
In a 1991 study, Kearney and Anderson looked at the
equity trends in Michigan public school finance from the
school year 1976-77 (three years after passage of the Equal
Yield Plan) through 1988-89. 2A1 Taking students as the
2 42
initial equity target, it is clear that horizontal equity
among students declined during the thirteen-year period
studied. Using local revenue plus state membership aid per
pupil as the equity object, Kearney and Anderson note that
"[t]here is twice as much horizontal inequity in 1988-89 as
there was in 1976-77, " "4 whether one measures equity using

the time of the writing of this Note. It is unclear what effect, if any, the school-choice
program will have on the allocation of funds among the state's school districts, but
because the provision does not call for interdistrict school choice, the effect would seem
to be minimal. This Note will not consider its impact beyond discussing how an
alternative school-finance program would mesh with the current school-choice program
or an interdistrict choice program.
240. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
241.

C. PHILIP KEARNEY & DAVID M. ANDERSON, EQUITY TRENDS IN MICHIGAN SCHOOL

FINANCE (1991). Kearney and Anderson explicitly refuse to summarize their findings
or draw any general conclusions, but rather invite the reader to analyze the material
presented and draw her own conclusions. Id. at 46. This Note takes them up on their
invitation and bases its conclusions on their data.
242. Although this Note also is concerned with promoting vertical equity in any
school-finance plan, it is difficult to measure accurately vertical equity and trends in
vertical equity. See id. at 5; Kearney & Chen, supra note 6, at 365-66. Thus, this Note
does not consider the impact of the Equal Yield Plan on vertical equity.
243. KEARNEY & ANDERSON, supra note 241, at 8.
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a restricted range"
or the federal range ratio.2r
Moreover, there is a strong positive correlation between the
local revenues plus state membership aid per student and the
SEV per student.24
This correlation indicates that the
relative tax wealth of a district is a large determinant of how
Such correlation between a
many dollars are available.U
relative tax burden and available revenues led Kearney and
Anderson to write, "Equality of opportunity has worsened
over the thirteen year period."
When using current operating expenditure per student as
the equity object, Kearney and Anderson's findings indicate
that horizontal equity declined in a similar fashion as when
local revenues plus state membership aid is used as the
equity objectU 9 Moreover, SEV per pupil is somewhat
strongly correlated with current operating expenditures,2°
indicating a trend away from equality of opportunity."'
Turning to the taxpayer as the equity target, Kearney and
Anderson's results clearly point to a large and increasing gap
in horizontal equity under the Equal Yield Plan. Using levied
mills as the equity object, there has been a significant and

244. The "restricted range" measures the "difference between the values of the
equity objects per pupil at the 95th and fifth percentiles of the distribution." Id. at 4.
The restricted range ignores the upper and lower tails of the distribution and avoids
any undue influence from "outliers." An increase in the restricted range measure
indicates an increase in inequity between the fifth and 95th percentiles of the distribution. Id. In 1988-89, the restricted range measured $2641 in constant dollars
compared to only $1248 in 1976-77. Id. at 8-9.
.245. The "federal range ratio" is calculated by dividing the restricted range by the
value of the equity object per pupil at the fifth percentile. Id. at 4. Like the restricted
range, the federal range ratio avoids any undue influence from outliers, but has the
additional advantage of not being subject to equal percentage changes and shifts due
simply to inflation. Id. Also like the restricted range, any increase in the federal range
ratio indicates a decrease in horizontal equity. Id.
246. Id. at 14.
247. Id.
248. Id. Kearney and Anderson did not find an increase in inequity over the 13year period when using the McLoone Index, a measure that places emphasis on
reducing disparities in the bottom half of the dispersion. See id- at 12. Because this
Note is concerned with improving equity among all of the state's public schools, such
a finding is of little value.
249. Id. at 18, 20.
250. Id. at 24.
251. Looking beyond money as the equity object, Kearney and Anderson also
considered horizontal equity among students using instructional staff per 1000 students
as the equity object and found that although the spread between the schools with the
best student-teacher ratio has not increased over the 13-year period, there was still a
substantial difference of 17 instructional staffpersons per 1000 students between the
95th and fifth percentiles of the distribution in the 1988-89 period. Id. at 28-31.
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slightly increasing difference between the mills levied by those
in the fifth and ninety-fifth percentiles of the distribution. 2 In
fact, there was a difference of 15.450 mills between the ninetyfifth and fifth percentiles in the 1988-89 school year.2 Using
levied mills as the equity object is misleading, however, as the
Equal Yield Plan is not intended to produce identical
operational millage rates. On the contrary, the Plan allows a
great degree of local control in setting millage rates to raise
money for the local school district.'
The more salient question
is whether higher relative millage rates result in higher
relative revenues per student. Kearney and Anderson answer
this question in the negative by showing virtually no
correlation between mills levied and local revenues plus state
membership aid.25 This finding indicates that Michigan's
taxpayers are not rewarded with equal tax revenues for their
equal tax efforts as was intended by the TBE plan.
Finally, the most recently published school-spending statistics
indicate that the state of inequality has not improved since
1989, as there was a current operating expenditure spread of
$5959 per student between Michigan's wealthiest and poorest
school districts in the 1990-91 school year."6 Moreover, perstudent operating expenditures in the ninety-fifth percentile
cutoff totalled $5801, while the fifth percentile schools spent
7
under $3154 per student. 2

252. Id. at 38-41.
253. Id. at 39.
254. See supra text following note 221.
255. KERNEY & ANDERSON, supra note 241, at 44.
256. MICHIGAN DEP'TOFEDUC., BULLETIN 1014, at 14-15,28-29 (1991) [hereinafter
BULLETIN 1014]. This spending difference is particularly startling when one considers
that the highest-spending district, Oakland County's Lamphere Public Schools, is
relatively the same size as the lowest-spending district, Kingsley Area Schools of Grand
Traverse County. Id. Moreover, the two districts have a student-to-teacher ratio
difference of 13 students per teacher, as the Lamphere district has 27 students per
teacher, while the Kingsley district has only 14 students per teacher. Id.
The Department of Education's Bulletin 1014 also indicates that SEV per student
plays an important role in determining school spending. The district at the top filth
percentile cutoff in per-student SEV had a SEV of $201,175 per student, levied 25.29
mills for operations, and spent $4673 per student for current operating expenditures,
while the district at the lowest fifth percentile cutoffhad a per-student SEV of $37,521,
levied 32.50 mills, and spent $3582 per student. Id. at 9, 19. Even within the same
county, SEV per student creates fantastic spending disparities. In southeastern
Michigan's Oakland County, the Birmingham City School District had a SEV per student of $308,402, levied 24.28 operating mills, and had a per-student current operating
expenditure level of $7673, while nearby Hazel Park had a per-student SEV of $29,241,
levied 39.04 mills, and spent $4444 per student. Id. at 28-29.
257. Id. at 9, 19.

FALL

1992]

Equity in Public Education

As horizontal equity among students and taxpayers was an
important mission for Michigan's Equal Yield Plan,m it is safe
to say that the mission has been less than successful. Inequity
among students and taxpayers was great when the plan was
enacted and actually has increased since the mid-1970s.259 A
commitment to equity in our public schools requires a
commitment to the reform of Michigan's school finance plan.

V. A PROPOSAL FOR FSF:
MICHIGAN NEEDS A SECOND CHANCE

Twenty years after the adoption of a TBE plan, Michigan
is again at a crossroads in school-finance policy, and the
climate is one of reform. The Equal Yield Plan has failed to
meet its essential goal of providing equity for students and
taxpayers. The electorate seems hungry, but not ravenous,
for property tax reform,m° and the public is concerned with
reforming school finance. 2 6 ' The 1973 passage of the Equal
258. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
259. Although the 1991 enactment of the tax-base-sharing provision is clearly a step
in the direction of increased equity, see supra notes 235-42 and accompanying text, to
date it has had virtually no effect on equity in Michigan's schools as implementation
of the provision has been stalled in Michigan's courts. Mark Hornbeck, Schools Wary
of Engler Tax Plan,DET. NEWS, Jan. 26, 1993, at BI (reporting that Macomb Circuit
Judge Lido Bucci ruled that the tax-base-sharing plan is unconstitutional insofar as it
withholds certain mandatory state payments to school districts when the school
districts fail to comply, and speculating that the plan could be tied up in court for a few
more years). Even if the dollars are distributed as planned, there will be little effect
on equity as the amount redirected is quite minimal relative to the size of the gaps.
Interview with C.Philip Kearney, supra note 194. Moreover, the controversy over the
"Robin Hood" plan has had the unforeseen negative effect of driving a wedge between
the in-formula and out-of-formula districts. Id.
260. After the 1992 failure of two property tax reform ballot initiatives, one taxreform advocate explained "[Pleople are tired of tax schemes. They want real property
tax relief." Johnson, supra note 2, at A10.
261. At the time this Note went to press, the Michigan electorate was preparing
to vote on a ballot proposal that would substantially revamp the state's property tax
and school-funding schemes. See Chris Christoff, Engler-Backed Tax Plan Will Face
Voters, DET. FREE PRESS, Apr. 1, 1993, at 1A. Under the proposal, most school millage
rates would be rolled back to eighteen mills, but local school districts would be
permitted, with voter approval, to levy an additional nine mills. Id at 12A. To
replace the tax revenues lost to the property tax rollback, the state sales tax would be
increased from four to six percent. Property tax assessments would be rolled back
three percent from their 1993 levels; they would be frozen at that level in 1994; and
after 1994, they would be annually increased at the lesser of five percent or the rate
of inflation. Finally, in a substantial move toward equity, the proposal guarantees
that all school districts will spend a minimum of $4800 per student. Id.
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The ballot proposal, which received bipartisan legislative support and was endorsed
by Governor John Engler, provides a significant first step toward equity in Michigan's
public schools. By guaranteeing $4800 per student, the legislature and Governor
Engler have made clear their concern with equity. But the proposal will not create
complete equity in Michigan's schools. The $4800 per-student guarantee is only a
base-schools may levy an additional nine mills with voter approval, and wealthy
districts will be able to retain all of the revenue raised from taxing high-valued
property. In terms of taxpayer equity, the shift from the property tax to the regressive
sales tax may further burden low-income state residents. Despite these shortcomings,
the proposal would improve equity in Michigan's public schools and would go a long
way toward making the state the guarantor of educational opportunity in Michigan.
Before adopting the current ballot proposal to roll back property taxes and increase
the state sales tax, Michigan legislators proposed several mechanisms to overhaul
Michigan's school-finance scheme. One proposal advanced by a bipartisan legislative
"Team" called for a 50% reduction in school operating taxes for homeowners and
farmers and an increase in the state income tax rate to replace the school revenues lost
to the property tax cut. Memorandum from the Bi-Partisan Legislative "Team" to
House Colleagues/Senate Colleagues (Feb. 4, 1993) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform). To finance Michigan's public schools, the Team
proposal provided for a state education financing authority to levy a 17 mill residential
and agricultural property tax in 1993 and 1994 (which will be reduced to 16 mills in
1995) and an increase in the state income tax to six percent. The Team proposal would
have distributed the school revenues by payment of a per-student basic grant to the
school district in which the student is enrolled. In addition, local school districts would
have been able to levy a resident income tax to be distributed to the local school
district. Id. Although the Team proposal would have been welcomed for its equity and
property tax relief attributes, the increased reliance on the flat-rate income tax may
have been quite regressive, as low-income Michiganders may have been forced to cut
further into their necessity expenditures than the higher-income state residents.
Governor John Engler also had proposed a drastic tax cut plan which would have
undoubtedly impacted the state's schools. Peter Luke, Engler to Unveil Tax Plan,ANN
ARBOR NEWS, Jan. 26, 1993, at Al. Under the plan, local school property taxes would
have been cut 10% in the first year to offset residential property assessments, which
are expected to increase an average of 11%. Property taxes would have again been
slashed in the second and third years by reducing the assessment ratio on which the
taxes are based from 50% to 40% of a home's value. Id.
Moreover, in his budget proposal for the 1993-94 fiscal year, Governor Engler
initially had suggested several drastic school-spending measures. Under Governor
Engler's initially proposed budget, state school aid would have been increased by $94
million. Districts that levy at least 34.6 mills would have received a minimum of $4211
per student, but per-student funds would not have been equalized above that level. The
controversial tax-base-sharing provision would have been repealed. And in a move
toward choice, $240 million for adult education would have been divided by competitive
bid among providers that would include nonprofit organizations, private contractors,
and public schools. See Dawson Bell, EnglerProposes EducationShake- Up, DET. FREE
PRESS, Mar. 20, 1993, at 3A. Taken together, Governor Engler's tax plan and budget
proposal would seem to have had several effects on school funding and would have
created several uncertainties. It is unclear that the infusion of state monies proposed
by Governor Engler would have been adequate to compensate schools for tax revenues
lost to the tax cut proposal. Moreover, there is no sure and identifiable revenue source
from which the additional state funds would have been obtained. The per-student
funding base would have been, however, a praiseworthy step in the direction of
increased equity. But the proposed repeal of the tax-base-sharing provision and the
failure to equalize per-student funds across the board would have only resulted in
continued inequity.
In addition to the school-funding schemes advanced by government officials, several
education advocates have offered school-funding reform proposals. One such proposal,
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Yield Plan and the recent approval of tax-base-sharing reflect
the state's ongoing concern with providing equity for our
children and taxpayers. Given this concern, any reform
proposal should emphasize the equity value.
But no school-finance scheme is a panacea-there always
will be a need for tradeoffs among our essential values.
Adequate schools require dollars, and dollars imply taxes.
Equity requires a degree of state control of funding, and state
control implies a loss of autonomy.
Nonetheless, this
quagmire of tradeoffs is not insurmountable. Michigan has
expressed its concern with creating equity. With proper
safeguards, school-finance reform can create equity without
significantly sacrificing other values.
To achieve the goal of obtaining equity for Michigan's
children and taxpayers while accommodating other values
and the desire to control taxes, Michigan should adopt a FSF
plan with provisions to also address vertical equity and local
control. To promote horizontal equity among students, all
revenues earmarked for school spending (except those
retained by the local district under the provision set forth
below) should be directed to the state to be distributed to the
school districts on an equal per-student basis. Vertical
equity can be promoted by essentially maintaining the state's

offered by Professor Philip Kearney and former Detroit School Board Finance Chairman
David Olmstead, calls for a rollback of school millage rates to 30 mills and an
expenditure by the state to reimburse schools for lost revenues. Press Release,
Olnstead/Kearney Proposal, Jan. 15, 1992 (on fie with the University of Michigan
Journalof Law Reform). Dubbed "50-50 plus the lottery," the proposal aims to increase
state school spending to equal total local school property taxes plus state lottery
proceeds.
Id.
While providing clear increases in taxpayer equity, the
Olmstead/Kearney Proposal would not have an immediate effect on equity among
students, as the plan calls for reimbursement of lost local district revenues in the short
run, but phases out this built-in maintenance of the status quo in the longer term by
tying per-pupil revenues for "equity" districts (read: in-formula districts) to an
increasing "equity index." See id.
Perhaps the most radical school-finance reform package was introduced by the
Michigan Education Association (MEA). Like the Olmstead/Kearney proposal, the MEA
plan would limit local millage rates to 30 mills and require the state to increase
funding to poorer school districts. But the MEA plan goes a step further toward
centralized school funding by reorganizing the more than 500 school districts in the
state into 14 regional districts. Moreover, the MEA plan provides for a degree of local
autonomy by allowing the individual districts to vote themselves a one percent income
tax for schools. See Janet Miller & Patricia Windsor, EducatorsFind Points to Praise

in MEA Plan,ANN ARBOR NEWS, Jan. 26, 1993, at Cl. Although it is unclear whether
the MEA plan will continue the existing structure of local millage rates or whether it
will levy mills at the regional district level, this plan should be given attention because
it increases equity, further centralizes funding, and maintains some local control.
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current system of categorical grants. 2 Moreover, because
small schools do not enjoy the same economies of scale as
larger districts, the state should provide an additional
categorical grant to small school districts so that they may
provide the essential capital resources such as libraries,
computers, and athletic facilities.2 Categorical aid also may
be necessary in those districts which face higher costs in
providing the essential resources. For instance, a district
which has a higher cost of living may need to offer higher
salaries to attract teachers.
To promote equity among taxpayers, the FSF plan should
be financed by a uniform, statewide homestead property tax
rate and uniform commercial and industrial property tax
rates for school expenditures. All school tax revenues should
go to the state for distribution. Granted, savvy taxpayers in
wealthy school districts will be sounding the "Robin Hood"
horn louder than ever under such a plan, but if the plan is
marketed as a uniform, statewide rate rather than a
recapture of all excess revenues, it may not face insurmountable political difficulties. 2c
Finally, the proposed reform
would have to provide safeguards for its existence by
prohibiting unauthorized local tax overrides and the use of
local supplemental funds to increase spending in local school
districts.2 6 5

262. See supra notes 222-34 and accompanying text.
263. To the greatest extent possible, the state also should encourage consolidation
of small districts to capitalize on any available economies of scale opportunities.
264. This Note argues for reliance on a statewide property tax to fund the state's
schools, rather than an elimination of or rollback on property taxes, and an increased

reliance on other state taxes such as the income and sales taxes for several reasons.
First, because Michigan traditionally has funded its schools through property taxes, it
seems likely that the shift from local to statewide funding will be more palatable with
a familiar revenue-generating mechanism-the homestead property tax. Second, a
statewide property tax rate would provide relief for those districts that need it most,
and lesser relief for those currently without a heavy property tax burden. Third, if the
property tax burden proves to be too great under this proposal, it should not be unduly
difficult for legislators to grant statewide property tax relief and shift the schoolfunding burden to state income and sales taxes. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, the property tax may be a more stable source of revenue than either the
income or sales taxes. The property tax, although certainly tied to Michigan's economy,
does not respond as directly to minor economic downturns as the income and sales
taxes. Interview with C. Philip Kearney, Professor of Education, University of
Michigan, in Ann Arbor, Michigan (Feb. 5, 1993). Moreover, even when one type of
property (residential, for instance) is experiencing a drastic decline in value, other
sources of property tax revenues (such as agricultural and commercial property) may
remain relatively stable and work to iron out the downturns.
265. See supra notes 109-15 and accompanying text.
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To promote a degree of local control, however, the state
should authorize school districts to levy up to three mills as
an enrichment fund. These three mills should be levied on
a state-guaranteed tax base, which should be set high enough
to maintain a high degree of taxpayer and student equity.
The additional revenues will give taxpayers and parents the
flexibility to promote innovation and experimentation
without greatly increasing the per-student spending gap
between schools.
How does this proposal affect the values identified in Part
II? The FSF proposal certainly meets the objective of achieving equity among children and taxpayers. FSF not only
improves equity in theory, but it improves equity in practice;
the California experience with FSF shows that 2per-student
6
funding differentials can be virtually eliminated. 1
As for liberty and local control, it is clear that centralizing
school funding will inhibit local control to some degree, but
the three-mill enrichment allowance will provide some
autonomy.2 6 Moreover, as was discussed above, the value of
local control may be suspect, given the fact that it may not be
appropriate to trust our children's futures to the local
community's whims. 268
One additional benefit of lodging responsibility for funding
the public schools with the state is that local financial
difficulties or local voter refusal to bear a heavy tax burden
likely will have little effect on school funding. At the time
this Note was written, the school district of Kalkaska, located
in the rural northern part of Michigan's lower peninsula, was
faced with a financial crisis, and the Kalkaska voters were
given a choice of approving a 7.36-mill property tax increase
or closing the school doors ten weeks early. 269 School officials
had already decided not to operate the district with a large
deficit, and the state had refused to put the district in

266. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
267. This three-mill allowance may prove to be quite generous and more than
adequate to allay the fears of those who support local control. For instance, a threemill rate levied over a state guaranteed tax base equal to a per-student SEV of
$150,000 translates into $450 per student in additional revenues. See supra note 28.
268. See supra part II.B.
269. David Hacker, Kalkaska Vote Means School's Out, DET. FREE PRESS, Mar. 16,
1993, at 3A; see also Kalkaska: Blame School Cuts on State Inequities, DET. FREE PRESS,

Mar. 18, 1993, at 14A; Put Kalkaska in Receivership, DET. FREE PRESS, Mar. 19, 1993,
at 6A.
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receivership.2 70 Thus, when the local voters rejected the
millage increase, the Kalkaska Class of 1993 graduated ten
weeks earlier than usual, and with an upbeat sense of
humor, dubbed themselves the "Class of 92 3/4. " 271 Although
it is useless to cast blame 272 or find the cause of the tragedy
in Kalkaska (there are, after all, many possible reasons for
a lack of school funds), it is not unlikely that a system of FSF
could have prevented the fiscal crisis in that local school
district, as the state could simply have supplied the
necessary funds from a statewide pool of education dollars.
Of course, a sagging statewide economy would create
pressure to decrease funds to all state schools under FSF, but
at least no single local district would bear the burden of a
depressed local economy.
On efficiency grounds, this FSF proposal is difficult to
evaluate. Some may argue that throwing money at poorly
run schools may be wasteful. But it can be contended equally
that the current system may throw money at inefficient
schools in wealthy districts. Perhaps efficiency concerns are
better handled by providing incentives for efficient management of our schools.2 73
Finally, and perhaps of greatest concern, Michigan must
work to preserve the perceived quality of its schools to avoid
flight to private schools and prevent further parental
dissatisfaction. Financial constraints will make it extremely
difficult to level all schools up to the per-student funding
levels of the wealthiest schools. Nonetheless, per-student

270. See Hacker, supra note 269, at 3A; Kalkaska: Blame School Cuts on State
Inequities, supra note 269, at 14A.
271. See Hacker, supra note 269, at 3A; Kalkaska: Blame School Cuts on State
Inequities, supra note 269, at 14A. School officials reportedly are planning another
millage election to salvage the remainder of the 1992-93 school year, Kalkaska: Blame
School Cuts on State Inequities, supra note 269, at 14A, and Governor Engler has
appointed a panel to investigate the situation and make recommendations. Put
Kalkaska in Receivership, supra note 269, at 6A.
272. One editorial, however, did not withhold blame so easily:
It's easy to condemn Kalkaska's hard-pressed taxpayers-most of whom don't
have children in local schools-for selfishness, its school administrators for fiscal
incompetence, its teachers for greed. But the real blame must be placed where
it belongs: on Michigan's unfair, inadequate system of public school finance,and
on the feckless Lansing politicians who have refused for two decades to fix it.
Kalkaska: Blame School Cuts on State Inequities, supra note 269, at 14A.
273. See, e.g., CHUBB & MOE, supranote 60, at 216-32 (advocating a school choice
plan as a means ofimproving the efficiency and quality of America's schools); CARNEGIE
FOUNDATION, supranote 115, at 79-82 (recommending a shift toward school-based management).
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spending levels must be maintained at a sufficient level so
that wealthy schools will not take an extreme hit. Gains in
equity may require the pain of higher taxes, but if Michigan
is serious about improving its schools, it seems difficult to
imagine a finance-reform mechanism that will not impose
some pain on either parents, students, or taxpayers.
Skeptics of FSF will likely point to the defeat of a similar
FSF proposition just over twenty years ago, 274 and argue that
FSF is unpopular in the state. The response to that is
simple-that was twenty years ago. Michigan has witnessed
the failure of TBE and is aching for a second chance. The
Equal Yield Plan and the legislature's subsequent tinkering
have proven wholly ineffective in improving our schools and
increasing equity. The legislature and the electorate seem
willing to try significant reform such as the recent experiment with intradistrict school choice.275 If the legislature
feels confident in the virtues of school choice, it will be easier
to implement choice at the interdistrict level with FSF.276
Besides, the shift from TBE to FSF is not nearly as drastic as
the rejected attempt to shift from an FP to FSF. Perhaps
most importantly, the Michigan electorate may not have been
amenable to the radical shift from a FP to FSF twenty years
ago, but today the electorate may be open to reform and the
shift from TBE to FSF will not be considered as radical.
CONCLUSION

Twenty years after embarking on a path toward improved
equity in Michigan's schools, Michigan has reached a crossroads, a choice between continuing down the failed path of
TBE or the adoption of reform to improve quality and equity
in our public schools. Reform through the courts seems all
but foreclosed. Reform on a small scale has been inadequate.
Reform must come through an overhaul of the state's schoolfinance mechanism. To ensure an equal opportunity for our
children, Michigan should adopt FSF and invest in our
children's futures.
274.
275.

See supra notes 195-99 and accompanying text.
See supra note 239.

276. Interdistrict choice will be easier to implement with FSF because each student
will be awarded an equal endowment which he may spend in any district of his choice.
With TBE and varying local tax rates, taxpayers rightfully may be upset if they watch
students spend their tax dollars at neighboring districts, and these taxpayers may
refuse to vote for millage renewals or increases, thus frustrating the choice plan.

